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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ALIENS - MCCARRAN ACT - ADMITTED HOMOSEXUAL CAN BE
DEPORTED AS "PSYCHOPATHIC PERSONALITY" WITHIN ACT, EVEN
WITHOUT A MEDICAL EXAMINATION.
Boutilier v. INS (2d Cir. 1966)
In September 1963 petitioner filed an application for naturalization
in which he admitted that he had been arrested for and discharged of the
crime of sodomy.' In reply to an immigration officer's request for more
information, ,he revealed a history of homosexual activity which had begun
prior to his entry into the United States.2 This disclosure was relayed
for review to the United States Public Health Service which found that
petitioner "was afflicted with a class A condition, namely, psychopathic
personality, sexual deviate, at the time of his admission to the United
States for permanent residence .... "3
Deportation proceedings were commenced, and at hearings held before
a special inquiry officer,4 petitioner declined to submit to an examination
conducted by Public Health Service doctors. The officer found that peti-
tioner had been a homosexual at the time of entrance into the United
States and was therefore deportable.5 After an unsuccessful appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals,6 a petition to vacate the order was filed
1. N.Y. PEN. LAW § 690,
2. Boutilier admitted that his first homosexual experience occurred in Canada
when he was fourteen years of age and that from the time he was sixteen until the
time he came to the United States five years later, he voluntarily engaged in homo-
sexual activity on the average of three or four times per year. His continued deviancy
after entry into the United States caused the Selective Service System to designate
him as unfit for military service. Boutilier v. INS, 363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert.
granted, 385 U.S. 927 (1966).
3. Id. at 491.
4. "A special inquiry officer shall conduct proceedings under this section to deter-
mine the deportability of any alien. ... Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
§ 242(b), 66 Stat. 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1964) [hereinafter cited as McCarran Act].
5. "Any alien in the United States ... shall . . . be deported who - (1) at the
time of entry was within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law
existing at the time of such entry .... McCarran Act § 241(a), 66 Stat. 204 (1952),
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1964). "[T]he following classes of aliens shall be . . . excluded
from admission into the United States: . . . (4) Aliens afflicted with sychopathic
personality. McCarran Act § 212(a), 66 Stat. 182 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1964).
No serious question was raised by the petitioner at the deportation hearing con-
cerning the Public Health Service's finding that he was a homosexual. The contro-
versy centered upon the propriety of the service's determination that a homosexual is
necessarily afflicted with a psychopathic personality.
6. "The Board is a quasi-judicial body in the Office of the Attorney General.
The Board has jurisdiction to review on appeal orders entered by special inquiry
officers in deportation cases. ... U.S. OrVICE oF THE FEgDERA RgGISTER, UNITED
STATES ORGANIZATION MANUAL 225 (1965-66).
(336)
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with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The
court dismissed the petition holding that (1) the Public Health Service
could conclude on these facts that petitioner was afflicted with a psycho-
pathic personality without conducting a medical examination since such
an examination is mandatory only in exclusion proceedings, and (2) the
term "psychopathic personality" as used in the McCarran Act is not
void for vagueness since the act's purpose is not to regulate conduct, but
to exclude aliens who possess certain characteristics. Boutilier v. INS,
363 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S. 927 (1966).
In essence, Boutilier raises two significant points in his petition. He
insists that by reason of section 234 of the McCarran Act 7 he is entitled to
a medical examination before it may be certified that he is afflicted with
a psychopathic personality, notwithstanding his earlier disinclination to
submit to such an examination." He further maintains that the term
"psychopathic personality" is void for vagueness, thus making the deporta-
tion order issued pursuant to it an act which deprives him of due process
of law.
While it has long been held by the Supreme Court that the power
to exclude aliens is an exercise of the constitutional grant to the federal
political departments to control foreign relations, and therefore exempt from
judicial review,9 deportation procedures have not been accorded an identical
immunity.' 0 The application of these established doctrines to the "delayed
exclusion" provision of the McCarran Act" raises a problem of statutory
construction since the proceeding under this provision is by explicit state-
ment of the act one of deportation, and yet the standard set to determine
7. The physical and mental examination of arriving aliens . . . shall be made
by medical officers of the United States Public Health Service, who shall . . .
certify . . . [any medical defect] observed by such medical officers in any such
alien .... Medical officers . . . who have had special training in the diagnosis of
insanity and mental defects shall be . . . employed . . . and . . . shall be provided
with suitable facilities for the . . . examination of all arriving aliens who it is
suspected may be excludable under paragraphs ... (4) . . . of section 1182(a)....
McCarran Act § 234, 66 Stat. 198 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1224 (1964). See statute cited
note 5 supra.
8. It could be urged that Boutilier is estopped from making this contention[that he is entitled to an examination] in view of his rejection of the government's
offer to have the Public Health Service conduct an in personain examination. But,in view of the serious consequences of a deportation order and the government's
failure to press this point, we shall make our determination on the merits.
363 F.2d at 492 n.8.
9. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952) ; Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893) ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S.
651, 659 (1892). See also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).10. Findings of fact in deportation proceedings, which are initially administrative,
are final unless determined to be clearly erroneous. Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229(1953); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22, 34-35 (1939) ; United States ex rel.
Vajtauer v. Commissioner, 273 U.S. 103 (1927) ; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod,
264 U.S. 131 (1924). But cf. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945). However, the
courts will have the final authority over questions of statutory construction. Bridges
v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149 (1945); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) ; Gonzales v.
Williams, 192 U.S. 1 (1904). See also Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Seegenerally Note, 5 STAN. L. Rxv. 722 (1953) ; Comment, 8 VILL. L. RPv. 566 (1963).
11. McCarran Act § 241 (a)(1), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1)(1964). See statute cited note 5 supra. See Note, 68 YALt L.J. 931 (1959).
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deportability is that of excludability at the time of entry. An examination of
the cases decided under this section and under a similar section in the prior
act reveals that the scope of judicial review has been severely limited
by the courts on the theory that in an area such as this, where the deter-
mination of deportability is dependent upon the application of complex
and uncertain medical theories, the responsibility for application should
rest with those suited to do so, and not with the courts.12
The legislative history of the act indicates that Congress intended
to exclude homosexuals and other sexual deviates from admission to the
United States by its use of the term psychopathic personality. 13 Several
courts have read the act in this light and have barred sexual deviates from
entering the country. 14 In the instant case, the court summarily dismissed
petitioner's claim that he was entitled to an examination to determine his
mental state under section 23415 by finding that the section applies only to
exclusion proceedings and not to deportation proceedings. 16 Since the
petitioner is subject to deportation, not exclusion, the standards governing
that proceeding are set forth in section 242(b). 1 7 The court noted that,
"Boutilier does not claim that the government failed to comply with the
rules and regulations which guide the conduct of deportation proceedings."'"
The Court's finding that section 234 did not apply and that Boutilier
failed to claim that there was a violation of the procedure set forth in
section 242(b), was the only consideration given to the question of
whether the petitioner's rights were violated by the absence of a medical
examination. It is suggested, however, that further analysis of the relevant
sections of the act raises a question of statutory construction, the answer
to which might indicate that petitioner's rights were violated or at least
ignored. It may be asked: if an entering alien must be given a medical
examination in order to be certified a psychopathic personality and there-
fore excludable at the time of entry, and excludability at the time of entry
is the crucial prerequisite to his present deportability, does it not follow
that he must now be given a medical examination to establish excluda-
bility? There are arguments both for and against this construction,' 9
12. E.g., United States ex rel. Leon v. Murff, 250 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1957),
affirming United States ex rel. Leon v. Shaughnessy, 143 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1956) ; United States ex rel. Pawlowec v. Day, 33 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 594 (1929). See Note, 68 YALX L.J. 931, 933-42 (1959).
13. Existing law does not specifically provide for the exclusion of homosexuals
and sex perverts .... The Public Health Service has advised that the provisions
for the exclusion of aliens afflicted with psychopathic personality ... is sufficiently
broad to provide for the exclusion of homosexuals and sex perverts. This change
of nomenclature is not to be construed in any way as modifying the intent to
exclude all aliens who are sexual deviates.
S. RmP. No. 1137, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952).
14. Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Flores-
Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1956). See Note, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rgv. 191 (1963).
15. See statute cited note 7 supra.
16. 363 F.2d at 492.
17. 66 Stat. 208 (1952), 8 U.S.C. 1252(b) (1964).
18. 363 F.2d at 492.
19. The principal argument against such a reading is: if this were the intent
of Congress, it could have expressly so stated, as it did in the exclusion procedure,
[VOL. 12
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but it is disturbing that the court did not even consider whether the
procedure presently employed complies with even the narrowest construc-
tion of the statute.
The dissent presumably disagrees with the statutory interpretation
rendered by the majority but does not offer an alternative, or even con-
sider one. Instead it is asserted: "Both the procedure and the statutory
interpretation used by the immigration authorities in this deportation
proceeding are not only offensive to, but, in my opinion, completely
lacking in, due process .... -20 It is submitted that an argument such as
advanced above, rather than due process, would have been more pointed,
and possibly more cogent, especially in light of the poor reception due
process arguments have been given in deportation proceedings. 21
Judge Kaufman, writing for the majority, next turned to a con-
sideration of Boutilier's contention that the use of the term "psychopathic
personality" renders the statute vague and therefore void. He dismissed this
contention because "upon examining the rationale of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine," the court concluded that it was inapplicable.2 2 The underlying
rationale of the doctrine is the fiction that everyone knows the law. From
this proposition stems the corollary that, "legislation must be sufficiently
precise to afford adequate notice of the standards by which the individuals
affected are required to guide themselves. ' 23 This corollary has been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.,24
as being based upon the fifth 25 and sixth26 amendments. The Court in
Cohen therefore reasoned that:
The sole remaining inquiry . . . is the certainty or uncertainty
of the text in question, that is, whether the words [of the statute] ...
constitute a fixing by Congress of an ascertainable standard of guilt
and are adequate to inform persons accused of violation thereof of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them.2 7
and further, since the criteria is the condition at the time of entry, a present exami-
nation is worthless. On the other hand, it might be contended that deportation is
more serious than exclusion and if Congress extended this right to incoming aliens
to whom it owed no duty, surely it intended to provide at least the same protection to
those who have become residents. Secondly, since psychopathy does not develop in-
stantaneously, its present existence is at least an indication of previous existence.
20. 363 F.2d at 496.
21. E.g., in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel, Accardi, 349 U.S. 280 (1955),
publication of Attorney General's belief that alien was deportable was held not to be
basis for attributing bias to Board of Immigration Appeals under his supervision. In
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S. 460 (1912), preliminary interrogation in the
absence of counsel and denial of process to compel testimony was permitted. See
United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U.S. 131 (1924). See Note, 5 STAN. L. REv. 722
(1953) ; Note, 68 YALU L.J. 931 (1959).
22. 363 F.2d at 495. For commentary on the void for vagueness doctrine see
generally Collings, Unconstitutional Uncertainty - An Appraisal, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 195
(1955); Note, 62 HARV. L. Rev. 77 (1948); Note, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 67 (1960).
23. 363 F.2d at 495.
24. 255 U.S. 81 (1921) ; accord, Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 458 (1927).
25. "No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
26. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be in-
formed of the nature and cause of the accusation .. " U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
27. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921).
WINTER 1967]
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In light of these constitutional requirements the Supreme Court has decided
that, "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in
terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of
due process of law."'28
Since the void for vagueness doctrine is applicable to statutes "which
either forbid or require the doing of an act," the doctrine necessarily finds
its greatest application in criminal statutes.29 However, the instant case is
not concerned with a criminal statute which seeks to control behavior. It
is one which merely establishes a characteristic based on past behavior.
In as much as there is nothing that Boutilier can do or refrain from doing
in order to remove himself from this category, he is not within the group
to which the void for vagueness doctrine affords protection. 0 Application
of the doctrine in this case would be unseemly for another reason. Since
the statute concerns behavior which has occurred in other countries, appli-
cation here would necessitate the extention of the fiction to the point of
assuming that foreign citizens are aware of a United States law and
thereby able to guide their conduct accordingly.
On two occasions the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
been faced with the problem of applying the void for vagueness doctrine
to this section of the act. In Fleuti v. Rosenberg,3' it was established that
the petitioner had engaged in homosexual activity both prior and subse-
quent to entry into this country. The court found that the special inquiry
officer had relied heavily on evidence of the post-entry behavior in
concluding that petitioner was a homosexual and therefore suffering from
a psychopathic personality. In light of this, the court held that the void
for vagueness doctrine was applicable because the statute did not give an
adequate warning. In Boutilier the court distinguishes this case on the
ground that, "there is not the slightest indication that the officer [in the
instant case] failed to understand that section 212(a) (4) was directed
solely at a pre-entry condition."13 2 However, in a recent per curiam opinion,
the Ninth Circuit has apparently extended its application of the doctrine
to cases where the only evidence is that of pre-entry homosexual behavior.3 3
In declaring the statute void the court stated that the petitioner's deporta-
tion is "grounded upon a finding that he was, at the time of entry to this
28. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ; accord, Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
29. While deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature the Supreme Court
has said, "deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of banishment
or exile. . . ." Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948). For this reason the
void for vagueness doctrine has been applied in deportation cases. Jordan v. De George,
341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951).
30. 363 F.2d at 495.
31. 302 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1962), remanded on other grounds, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
32. 363 F.2d at 495. It may be argued that Fleuti need not have been decided on
a constitutional basis but on the fact that the special inquiry officer had overstepped his
statutory authority in considering post-entry behavior in his finding.
33. Lavoie v. INS, 360 F.2d 27 (1966), petition for cert. filed, 35 U.S.L. WS-K
3131 (U.S. October 11, 1966) (No. 513).
[VOL. 12
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country, a homosexual .... -14 The only authority cited is the court's
prior opinion in Fleuti, thus apparently discounting any difference in facts.
Noting the opinion of the Ninth Circuit, Congress, in amending the
statute, stated: "To resolve any doubt the Committee has specifically
included the term 'sexual deviation' as a ground for exclusion in this
bill."35 The passage of this legislation and the decision in the instant case,
however, have not resolved all of the unanswered questions that are inherent
in this type of proceeding. Since the question of whether petitioner's be-
havior qualifies him as homosexual or sexual deviate was all but conceded
at the deportation hearing, 6 the court was not called upon to resolve two
problems which are engendered by the use of these terms by Congress in
its effort to clarify the meaning of "psychopathic personality." These prob-
lems are raised by Judge Moore in his dissenting opinion. Admittedly, the
terms sexual deviate and homosexual narrow the open-ended classification,
psychopathic personality, but, what in fact do they mean? Does Congress
seek to exclude everyone who has ever had an abnormal sexual experience,
or only to exclude those who have "a long-lasting and perhaps compulsive
orientation towards homosexual or otherwise 'abnormal' behavior" ?37 It
is urged by the dissent that adoption of the former interpretation of con-
gressional intent would be absurd in light of a number of scientific studies
on human sexual behavior which conclude that a significant percentage of
American males have had at least one homosexual experience.3 8 Assuming
that the latter interpretation is adopted, a second question manifests itself.
Is the evidence of Boutilier's pre-entry behavior persuasive enough to
justify a determination that he is a homosexual or sexual deviate? Judge
Moore thinks not. "The most adverse conclusion which can be derived
from petitioner's statements is that petitioner engaged in sexual activity
on a quite infrequent basis with both men and women during the five-year
period before his coming to the United States. '39
There is no easy solution to this problem. Congress has the right to
exclude whomever it pleases and to base exclusion on any reasonable
classification. But in this case the classification is based on open-ended
medical terms, the nature and extent of which are not agreed upon by
competent medical authority. Although the legislative history indicates
that these terms are used as words of art, "and not to be left to vagaries
and honest but conflicting theories of psychiatry for determination,' 40 the
conclusion is inescapable that until more definite and possibly arbitrary
criteria are established by judicial or legislative action, the honest but
conflicting theories of psychiatry are, in fact, the only standards avail-
34. Id. at 28.
35. S. Rep. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1965).
36. Brief for Respondent, p. 26a.
37. 363 F.2d at 498.
38. E.g., KINSEY, POMEROY & MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE
623 (1948); MASTERS & JOHNSON, HUMAN SEXUAL RESPONSE (1966).
39. 363 F.2d at 496.
40. 363 F.2d at 493.
WINTER 1967]
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able. The mere statement that the terms are used as words of art adds
nothing to the solution of the problem. Since it appears at 'this juncture
that the Supreme Court will review Boutilier, it is possible that the existing
conflict between the Second and Ninth Circuits concerning the effect of
the void for vagueness doctrine on the statutory term "psychopathic person-
ality" will be resolved. It is hoped that the Court will determine also whether
a medical examination - required in exclusion proceedings - is mandatory
in deportation proceedings which are based on prior excludability.
Marc B. Kaplin
ANTITRUST - MERGERS - FTC HAS IMPLIED POWER TO PETITION
FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION WHICH A COURT OF APPEALS
CAN GRANT WHEN IT IS REASONABLY PROBABLE THAT THE PRO-
POSED MERGER WILL BE VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON
ACT.
FTC v. Dean Foods Co. (U.S. 1966)
Prior to the completion of an investigation by the Federal Trade
Commission to determine whether a proposed merger" of Bowman Dairies
and Dean Foods would be violative of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act 2 and section 7 of the Clayton Act,3 the FTC sought
and was granted, by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, a temporary
restraining order to maintain the status quo between the two companies.
The Commission alleged that it would probably find the contemplated
merger illegal, and that if the merger were permitted to take place it
would be virtually impossible to frame an effective cease and desist order
1. The proposed merger would result in Dean Foods Company, the third or fourth
largest distributor of packaged milk in the Chicago area, taking over all of the process-
ing and retailing facilities of Bowman Dairies Company, the second largest competitor
in the area. Bowman would remain as a holding company for the remaining securities,
and would reinvest the purchase price paid by Dean Foods for the stockholders. See
FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 599 & n.1 (1966).
2. 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1964). "Unfair methods of com-
petition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are de-
clared illegal."
3. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). In pertinent part it states:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or
any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in
[VOL.. 12
7
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
since Bowman as a viable entity would no longer exist.4 The FTC further
alleged that as a consequence the court of appeals would be deprived of
jurisdiction to review the final Commission decision. At the hearing for
a preliminary injunction the court of appeals dissolved the restraining
order on the ground that the FTC lacked authority to petition for such
relief.5
Upon dissolution of the restraining order the two companies moved
to complete the merger. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the FTC,
immediately applied to the Supreme Court and was granted a preliminary
injunction. The Court granted certiorari, 6 reversed and remanded, 7 holding,
four justices dissenting," that the FTC had authority to seek preliminary
injunctions to maintain the status quo until it reached a final decision
as to the legality of a merger, and that under the All Writs Act9 the court
of appeals was authorized to issue such injunctions in order to preserve its
jurisdiction. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
Considerable legislative activity in the past ten years has revolved
around attempts by the FTC to obtain authority from Congress to issue
preliminary injunctions against proposed mergers or, in the alternative,
the authorization to seek such relief in the federal district courts.10 How-
ever, provisions of the Clayton Act concerning the issuance of preliminary
injunctions pending a final determination by the FTC have remained
unchanged." Therefore, it can be said that the procedure adopted by
the Court is procreative of a new enforcement power in the FTC.
any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition
may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
For an analysis of the recent applications of § 7 see generally Note, The ABC's of
Clayton 7: Amendment of 1950; Brown Shoe; The Court and Current Complexities,
10 VILL. L. Rxv. 734 (1965).
4. The FTC's allegation is based on the premise that the contemplated merger
terms will result in absorption of assets, sale of capital interests and depletion of
corporate management personnel that will in fact extinguish Bowman as a viable
corporate entity. If this occurs it becomes virtually impossible to return the economic
balance that once existed in the industry since a divestiture order would be incapable
of adequately returning the merged company to the two prior existing corporations,
Bowman Dairies and Dean Foods.
5. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1966).
6. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 383 U.S. 901 (1966).
7. On remand, the Seventh Circuit issued an injunction for four months. FTC v.
Dean Foods Co., No. 75493, 7th Cir., July 18, 1966. BNA ANTITRUST TRADE REG. RjEP.
No. 263, July 26, 1966, at A-1. The FTC examiner at the end of the hearing decided
that the proposed merger was not violative of either § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act or § 7 of the Clayton Act. 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1966 Trade Cas.) 17,682
(FTC Docket No. 8674, Sept. 12, 1966).
8. Justices Fortas, Harlan, Stewart and White joined in dissenting.
9. 63 Stat. 102 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964). "The Supreme Court and
all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles
of law."
10. For the legislative history, see FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 636
(1966) (appendix to the dissenting opinion). In the 89th Congress two bills were
introduced to amend the Clayton Act in order to give the FTC the statutory power to
follow the procedure utilized in the Dean case. H.R. 49 & H.R. 1574, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965).
11. Under the Clayton Act the district courts receive petitions for preliminary
injunctions from the United States Attorneys under the direction of the Attorney
WINTER 1967]
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The question of whether the FTC or other federal agencies have
implied authority to seek preliminary injunctions from the courts of
appeals has been considered on only two prior occasions. 12 In Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Transamerica Corp.," the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals issued a preliminary injunction on petition from
the Federal Reserve Board under the All Writs Act. There, banking
institutions whose controlling stock interests had been purchased by
Transamerica were enjoined from executing contracts to transfer their
assets to the Bank of America National Trusts. If this transfer had been
permitted to take place the Board would have lost jurisdiction over Trans-
america.' 4 On these facts the court of appeals granted an injunction in
order to prevent its final power of review from being abrogated. Six years
later, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in FTC v. International Paper
Co.,15 denied a similiar petition by the FTC that relied on Transamerica
as precedent. In International Paper the court premised its denial of the
FTC's petition on the lack of statutory authority vesting the Commission
with this power, and also on the ground that it would be a misapplication
of the All Writs Act for the courts of appeals to exercise jurisdiction in
such a case.
Thus the Supreme Court was faced with a split of authority among
the circuits with regard to the availability of the procedure followed in the
instant case, as well as the consistent refusal of Congress to amend the
Clayton Act in order to vest the FTC with statutory authority to petition
for such relief prior to the completion of its hearing procedure. In this
context the Court concluded that sufficient necessity existed to permit the
FTC to petition directly to the court of appeals for a preliminary injunction,
and that an untapped reservoir of judicial authority existed in the All
Writs Act to sustain the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals.
Of first import is the question of the FTC's standing to petition for
a preliminary injunction based merely on facts indicating that it is reason-
ably probable that the FTC will find the merger to be illegal.' 6 The Court
based its finding of FTC authority to do this on two grounds. First, the
General based on an alleged violation of § 7. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
Private individuals may petition for similar relief on equitable grounds. 38 Stat. 737
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964). For a discussion of an individual's right to seek a
preliminary injunction, see Maclntyre, Antitrust Injunctions: A Flexible Private
Remedy, 1966 DUKE L.J. 22.
12. In addition to the two cases referred to there were also two unreported
decisions that denied a petition for an injunction similar to the one in the Dean case.
FTC v. Farm Journal, Inc. (3d Cir. 1955) ; In the Matter of A. G. Spalding & Bros.
(1st Cir. 1955).
13. 184 F.2d 311 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 883 (1950).
14. This would have been the result based on the interpretation of the unamended
§ 7 of the Clayton Act (the pre-1950 version) as construed in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman
Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934).
15. 241 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1956). See Note, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1297 (1957).
16. The granting of injunctions under specific statutory powers does not exclude
the federal courts from exercising the equitable powers granted them by art. III § 2
of the Constitution. See Public Util. Comm'n v. Capital Transit Co., 214 F.2d 242(D.C. Cir. 1954).
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Court reasoned that the FTC was created to effectuate the general welfare
by enforcing the Clayton Act and that it is, therefore, vested with those
requisite incidental powers necessary to accomplish this task. Mr. Justice
Clark, writing for the majority, concluded that standing to petition for
the relief granted in the instant case is one of those necessary incidental
powers. 1 7 Second, the Court noted that since the FTC has standing to
institute contempt proceedings for violations of its final cease and desist
orders,' 8 as well as the authority to act as a party when the court of
appeals reviews a final decision, it should logically follow that the FTC
has standing to petition for preliminary injunctions from the courts of
appeals. In holding the procedure utilized in this case to be valid, the Court
also relied on the approach previously adopted in Transamerica.
Mr. Justice Fortas incisively takes issue with these propositions,
reasoning that the FTC was created contemporaneously with the passage
of the Clayton Act as "an expert administrative agency," and was "not
intended to be a litigation arm of the United States except in so far as its
[own] final orders are concerned."' 9 It seems evident that it is detri-
mental to the purpose of a fact-finding agency to allow it to seek a pre-
liminary injunction prior to completion of its hearing on the merits on
the premise that it will probably find that the proposed merger is illegal.
To allow the FTC to do so would necessitate not only a pre-judgment, but
would also require that the Commission litigate the issue from the same
position that it would have assumed if it had made a definitive determina-
tion. Coupled with the fact that in specific areas the FTC has been granted
statutory authority to petition for preliminary injunctions20 this strengthens
the position that Congress intentionally denied the FTC this power with
regard to the enforcement of section 7 of the Clayton Act. In the cases
cited by the majority only Transamerica squarely supports the Court's
action. However, the dissent distinguishes Transamerica on the ground
that there the jurisdiction of the FTC would have been lost entirely as
well as the review jurisdiction of the court of appeals, and that the instant
case concerns only the question of the FTC's difficulty in framing an effec-
tive cease and desist order.
The second issue that the Court considered was the apparent lack
of jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to grant such preliminary relief.
While the Clayton Act vests jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to review
final FTC orders, 21 nowhere does it vest them with the authority to issue
17. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 617 (1966).
18. The majority states in effect that no statutory authorization exists for this
power. Id. at 607. Justice Fortas writing for the dissent concludes that there is
statutory power for the FTC to institute contempt proceedings. Id. at 616 n.3 (dis-
senting opinion).
19. Id. at 617 (dissenting opinion).
20. In the area of false advertising the FTC can petition the district court for
injunctive relief. 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1964).
21. 38 Stat. 734 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21(c) (1964).
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preliminary injunctions. Rather, the Act authorizes the district courts
to exercise this power on petition by the Attorney General.22 Thus the
Court found it necessary to go outside the Act and upheld the exercise
of jurisdiction by a court of appeals on the basis of the All Writs Act.
This statute is designed to give the federal courts the jurisdictional power
to execute those writs "necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdiction .... -23 The Supreme Court held that since the contemplated
merger would make it almost impossible for the FTC to frame an adequate
cease and desist order, a court of appeals would therefore be deprived of
jurisdiction to effectively review the Commission's final determination.
Therefore, the Court found it appropriate for the court of appeals to protect
its judisdiction by issuing a preliminary injunction under the All Writs
Act preserving the status quo until the FTC completed its hearing.
Both the majority and the dissent agree that the All Writs Act can
be used when there has not yet been a perfected appeal, but do not agree
as to the extension of the concept of potential jurisdiction to sustain the
use of the All Writs Act. The dissent sees the concept of potential juris-
diction limited to the area of past application where the lower courts have
already assumed jurisdiction over a particular case and the court of appeals
has issued a writ to protect its review power over that case.2 4 To the
majority the instant case comes within the concept of potential jurisdiction.
The Court reasoned that if the FTC decides that the merger is illegal the
court of appeals will have jurisdiction to review this decision, but if the
parties consummate their plans before a final determination the FTC will
be unable to frame an effective cease and desist order, and the court of
appeals will in turn be unable to effectively exercise its power of review.
The Court thus held that under the All Writs Act the court of appeals can
issue an injunction to maintain the status quo in order to protect its potential
jurisdiction.
One issue that permeates both the majority and dissenting opinions
is the interpretation and weight that should be given to the legislative
history of the Clayton Act, and the reluctance of Congress to amend the
Act in order to give to the FTC the power to either issue or to directly
petition for preliminary injunctions. Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the
majority, sees the lack of statutory authority in the original Clayton Act
as not dispositive since the basis of his decision is not in the Clayton Act
but in the All Writs Act. For similiar reasons Justice Clark considers
the refusal of Congress to amend the Clayton Act as requested by the
FTC as irrelevant. On the contrary, Justice Fortas interprets the absence
of statutory authority in the Clayton Act for the FTC to petition for
22. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964).
23. 63 Stat. 102 (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964).
24. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 625 (1966) (dissenting opinion). The
dissent in reference to the cases cited by the majority states: "Each of them involved
issuance of a writ to prevent action or inaction by a trial court which would otherwise
mean that the case would not be adjudicated on its merits and therefore could not be
reviewed on appeal."
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preliminary injunctions in the area of section 7 enforcement as a categorical
denial of this power to the Commission. He reasons that the FTC was
intended to be an expert fact-finding agency and, therefore, is not to act
as a litigation arm in enforcement.2 5 This function is to be performed by
the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to the provisions of
the Clayton Act.2 6
The decision of the Court, as pointed out by the dissent, is not neces-
sarily impelled. In reality it is strained in its technical relation to both
precedent and statutory authorization. However, the Court's decision rests
on considerations other than mere legal logic. Apparently, the majority of
the Court feels it advantageous and necessary for the FTC to have this
enforcement ability, and considers the prior use of the All Writs Act
together with the fact that the FTC participates in other judicial pro-
ceedings as a substantial foundation for its holding.
Initially, it appears that the use of preliminary injunctions by the FTC
may be expedient since companies can be prevented from merging in such
a way that two viable entities will no longer exist. If such a merger
were to take place a cease and desist order would in most cases be
incapable of returning the industry to its pre-merger competitive balance.
Potentially detrimental consequences can also be avoided during the
interim period in which the injunction would require the status quo to
be maintained.2 7 Of course, if one considers mergers to be "per se"
improper and illegal, the Court's decision is clearly a necessary one.28 It
might thus be concluded that the procedure adopted by the Court is almost
universally beneficial.
There are, however, countervailing considerations. If a final decision
is in the favor of the companies involved they will have lost the benefit
of their merged status during the duration of the preliminary injunction,
and as a consequence the competitive system may have lost the benefit
of a merger that would in fact have increased competition.2 9 In the present
high pitched economic atmosphere a relatively short preliminary injunction
can frustrate a proposed merger due to the change in economic conditions.
In a case of this nature the company, its owners, and the national economy
25. Id. at 635 (dissenting opinion).
26. See note 11 supra.
27. See Note, 79 HARv. L. Rev. 391, 392 (1965).
28. Professor Cook intimates that this in fact is the disposition of the Supreme
Court. Cook Merger Law and Big Business: A Look Ahead, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 710,
712-15 (196).
29. The decision of the FTC examiner in this case was exactly to that effect:
The acquisition will not increase concentration in the sale and distribution of
packaged milk in the Chicago Area or contribute to any over-all trend towards
concentration in the sale and distribution of packaged milk in the United States....
The net effect of the acquisition, therefore, will be to contribute further to the
already declining level of concentration in the Chicago Area and to establish the
Chicago market as one of the least concentrated milk marketing areas in the
country.
3 TRAD RG. RAP. (1966 Trade Cas.) f 17,682 (FTC Docket No. 8674, Sept. 12, 1966).
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have each lost the possible long-range benefits merely on the FTC's finding
that it is reasonably probable that it will find the proposed merger illegal.
Because of the tremendous concern of business with mergers it is clear
that the FTC's policy is a critical factor in corporate economics. With this
in mind, the question presented is whether or not it is wise to eliminate
the Attorney General from the procedure for attaining preliminary injunc-
tions as provided under section 7 of the Clayton Act. 0 The mere fear that
the FTC will use a shotgun approach in exercising this power is in itself
a factor militating against corporate decisions to merge, notwithstanding
what the actual policy of the FTC will be.8 '
Litigation in the federal courts of appeals on petitions for preliminary
injunctions presents another difficulty resultant from the Dean Foods
decision. Appellate dockets are already overburdened, and the addition
of these cases will only increase this problem. It is difficult to forecast
how many petitions for preliminary injunctions the FTC will file, but the
strong desire of the FTC to have this power may be indicative of its
intent to make full use of it. A correlative consequence of having a court
of appeals hear such petitions is that the appellate courts are thus forced
to assume the role of trial courts. Mr. Justice Fortas was most adamant
in his criticism of this aspect of the majority's decision. He noted:
It places an unwise, unjustified and disruptive burden on the courts
of appeals and saddles them with original jurisdiction which they
cannot properly exercise and a fact-finding function in elaborate,
complex situations, which they should not be asked to undertake.8 2
He feels the courts structure is not adequately adaptable for this task in
light of the critical fact issues in cases under section 7 of the Clayton Act.
In light of these considerations it is possible that the sagacity of the
Dean Foods decision will lie in the difficulties it creates. Perhaps Congress,
in face of this decision, may be motivated to re-evaluate the current enforce-
ment procedures and to enact some definitive methods of enforcement that
properly weigh the competing interests involved.
Walter John Taggart
30. The FTC's impact on the over-all business community will be greatly in-
creased by the decision of the Court in the Dean Foods case. This is due to the fact
that the issuance of a preliminary injunction may have the practical effect of causing
the corporations to cancel the merger. Many corporate officials in the face of the high
costs of antitrust litigation, possible adverse public opinion and the adverse preliminary
finding of the court of appeals will simply choose to abandon the merger entirely.
31. The following observation by an analyst is germane:
Until it becomes clear exactly what impact the new procedure will have on
antimerger enforcement, the Supreme Court's decision is bound to have a deter-
rent effect on companies contemplating mergers, since it clearly affects the risk
they run. In the first place, some antitrust experts feel the decision will add to the
competitive spirit that already prevails between the two enforcement agencies and
may thereby produce more enforcement activity under Section 7.
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADt RnG. Rs'. No. 267, August 23, 1966, at B-4.
32. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 630 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
[VOL. 12
13
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DOUBLE JEOPARDY - STATE COURT
HOLDS FIFTH AMENDMENT'S DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROVISION APPLIC-
ABLE TO THE STATES THROUGH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
People v. Ressler (N.Y. 1966)
Defendant was tried under an indictment charging second degree
murder but was convicted of first degree manslaughter. The New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed judgment on the law and
facts and ordered a new trial.' Following the granting of defendant's
motion, the decision was amended to reverse solely on the law and a new
trial was again ordered.2 Cross appeals were taken to the New York
Court of Appeals which affirmed on the merits and held that since de-
fendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the second degree but
was convicted on a lesser charge, the fifth and fourteenth amendments
prohibit his retrial for the same criminal conduct on a more serious charge
than manslaughter in the first degree. People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y. 2d 174,
216 N.E.2d 582, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1966).
Unlike some other provisions of the Bill of Rights, the double jeop-
ardy clause of the fifth amendment has never been held by the United
States Supreme Court to be applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.4 Thus the federal courts have, for the most part,
struggled with more immediate problems involving the interpretation and
application of the double jeopardy clause.
One of the early issues concerned the relation between double jeopardy
and the power of a court to grant a new trial following an acquittal or
conviction. In United States v. Gilbert,8 a federal court held that it had
no power to grant a new trial following an acquittal or conviction where
the first trial contained no irregularity which would constitute a mistrial.
However, the Gilbert holding met with disfavor among other lower fed-
1. People v. Ressler, 24 A.D.2d 7, 261 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1965).
2. People v. Ressler, 24 A.D.2d 727, 262 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1965).
3. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination and
right to counsel: fifth and sixth amendments); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609(1965) (self-incrimination: fifth amendment) ; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)(confrontation of witnesses: sixth amendment); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478(1964) (self-incrimination and right to counsel: fifth and sixth amendments) ; Malloy
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination: fifth amendment) ; Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel: sixth amendment) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961) (unreasonable search and seizure: fourth amendment).
4. When the double jeopardy provision was originally placed before the House
of Representatives, a motion was made to insert after the words "same offense" the
words "by any law of the United States." The motion failed, permitting speculation
by negative inference that double jeopardy may have been intended to apply to the
states as well as the federal government. Sigler, A History of Double Jeopardy, 7 Am.
J. LEGAL HIST. 283, 305 (1963).
5. 25 Fed. Cas. 1287 (No. 15204) (C.C.D. Mass. 1834). Defendants had been
found guilty of robbery, a capital offense, and moved for a new trial.
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eral courts as exemplified by the decision in United States v. Keen,a in
which the court held that a new trial could be granted on defendant's
motion following a conviction, even though there was no error that would
constitute a mistrial. In United States v. Ball,7 the United States Supreme
Court rejected another facet of the Gilbert holding by deciding that the
double jeopardy provision did not preclude a second trial for the same
offense, when a conviction for the offense had been set aside.
In 1846, the question of collateral concern in this note - whether the
fifth amendment allows the reprosecution on the original indictment of a
defendant who has been convicted of a crime of lesser penalty than
charged in the indictment and who is successful on appeal - was an-
swered in the affirmative by a lower federal court in United States v.
Harding." An issue quite similar to that in Harding was presented to the
Supreme Court in Trono v. United States.9 In Trono, the defendants had
been indicted for murder and tried and convicted of assault. They appealed
to the highest court of the Philippines which, having jurisdiction to review
the case on both law and fact, entered a conviction of murder without
remanding the case for retrial. The decision was then affirmed by the
Supreme Court,10 which did not consider this reprosecution issue again
until Green v. United States."
Green was indicted by a District of Columbia grand jury which re-
turned an indictment containing two counts, one for arson and the other
for first degree murder. Under the latter count, the jury was charged on
first and second degree murder. The jury found Green guilty of second
degree murder without returning a verdict on the first degree murder
charge. Green successfully appealed,'12 but on remand was tried again for
first degree murder and found guilty. He filed another appeal and the
conviction was affirmed.' 3 The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that
the reversal need not be premised exclusively on the assumption that the
6. 26 Fed. Cas. 686 (No. 15510) (C.C.D. Ind. 1839). The court said that to
deny the defendant a new trial ".., guarantees to him the right of being hung, to
protect him from the danger of a second trial." Id. at 690.
7. 163 U.S. 662 (1896). However, the fifth amendment prohibits a subsequent
prosecution for the same offense where the defendant has been acquitted of the offense,
and a new trial cannot be had even though an acquittal may appear to be erroneous.
8. 26 Fed. Cas. 131 (No. 15301) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1846). One defendant had been
found guilty of murder, and two defendants convicted of manslaughter.
9. 199 U.S. 521 (1905).
10. The Court went further than in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896),
by holding that upon the successful appeal of the lesser offense, the defendant not only
waives the right not to be tried again for the offense for which he has been once
convicted, but also waives the right to plead once in jeopardy as to that part of the
judgment which acquitted him of the higher offense. Mr. Justice McKenna, dissenting
in Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 539 (1905), stated that the United States
freely affords means of review of erroneous rulings and judgments, and does not
require for their exercise the forfeiture of constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Holmes,
dissenting in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904), adopted a "continuing
jeopardy" theory to justify such reprosecutions. Under this theory jeopardy attaches
only after a final unappealable judgment has been rendered.
11. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
12. 218 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
13. 236 F.2d 708 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
[VOL. 12
15
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
silence of the jury on the first degree murder charge was an implicit
acquittal of Green on that charge, 14 but that under the subject circum-
stances (the jury was dismissed without Green's consent, and without
returning any express verdict on the first degree murder charge after
being given a full opportunity to do so) Green's jeopardy for first degree
murder came to an end when the jury was discharged and he could not
be retried for that offense.' 5 In rejecting the classic theories allowing
reprosecution relied on by the Government,16 the Court confined Trono to
its peculiar setting and held it not to be controlling since its doctrine
"would unduly impair the constitutional prohibition against double jeop-
ardy.'1 7 Accordingly, in establishing the federal standard for double jeop-
ardy, the Court held that where a defendant, tried in a federal court and
convicted of a lesser included crime than charged, overturns his convic-
tion, the fifth amendment prohibits reprosecution for the greater crime
even though the jury, in the original trial, did not return a formal verdict
of acquittal for the greater crime but remained silent as to it.18
While the interpretation of the fifth amendment's double jeopardy
provision was evolving, a similar evolution was taking place in regard to
whether the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment embodied
any double jeopardy limitations. The Court initially avoided the question
of whether the power of the states to reprosecute was restricted in any-
way by the fourteenth amendment by holding that under particular cir-
14. 355 U.S. at 188.
15. Id. at 190-91. The Court cited as authority Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684(1949), which held that the trial judge's premature termination of a trial before a
verdict is rendered does not bar a second trial on the same charge when such an act
is necessary to satisfy the ends of justice. See United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579(1824) ; but cf. Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1962) (jury discharged over
defendant's objection because prosecution's key witness not present). See generally
Comment, Double Jeopardy Its History, Rationale and Future, 70 DIcK. L. Riv. 377,
390-93 (1966) ; Note, Double Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problem, 77 HARV. L.
Riv. 1272, 1276-81 (1964).
A recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision, Commonwealth ex rel. Mont-
gomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859 (1966), held that a defendant whose
motion for mistrial was granted on the basis of the prosecutor's prejudicial summa-
tion, could be retried for murder without violating either the double jeopardy provision
of the state constitution or the fifth amendment of the federal constitution. However,
the court restricted its doctrine to situations where the prosecutor's conduct is not
calculated to stop a "losing trial," and the burden on the accused of being subjected
to a new trial is clearly outweighed by the interest of society in convicting the guilty.
In addition, the court distinguished Downum v. United States, supra, on the ground
that in Downum the jury was discharged over the defendant's objection. Common-
wealth ex rel. Montgomery v. Myers, supra at 193-94, 220 A.2d at 866.
16. 355 U.S. at 194-95. See note 10 supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court also
rejected the waiver theory, but stated that the fact that the defendant moved for a
mistrial is a factor to be considered on whether double jeopardy should be applied.
Commonwealth ex rel. Montgomery v. Myers, supra note 15, at 189-90, 220 A.2d at
864-65.
17. 355 U.S. at 197. In footnote 16 at 197 of the Court's opinion, it is stated that
the remarks made by Mr. Justice Peckham in the Trono opinion, that he regarded the
statutory provision as having the same effect as the fifth amendment, was not essential
to the decision and, therefore, even if the full court had accepted them, they would not
be decisive in this case where the interpretation of the fifth amendment is necessarily
decisive.
18. 355 U.S. at 184. Justice Frankfurter, in his dissenting opinion, gives the
history of the double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment. Id. at 198.
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cumstances the fifth amendment was not violated and, therefore, it was
not necessary to reach the fourteenth amendment issue.' 9 However, the
Court in Palko v. Connecticut" was unable to use this method of avoid-
ance. In Palko, the defendant was prosecuted by the state under an in-
dictment for first degree murder but was convicted of murder in the sec-
ond degree. In exercising its statutory right,2 1 the state successfully ap-
pealed and the judgment was reversed and a new trial ordered. 22 At the
second trial, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to death despite his contention that the right conferred by the
Connecticut statute placed him in double jeopardy. The Supreme Court
held that the reprosecution did not violate the defendant's constitutional
rights under the fourteenth amendment, 23 even though it was assumed
that the fifth amendment would have dictated a different result.2 4 Al-
though the Court indicated that the due process clause might bar a state
reprosecution in less meritorious circumstances, 25 it was not until Bartkus
v. Illinois,26 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Louisi-
ana ex rel. Francis V. Resweber,27 that it was clearly articulated that the
due process clause possesses some double jeopardy limitations.
The next question, and the question which faced the court in the
instant case, concerns the extent of the double jeopardy limitations im-
posed by the due process clause on the states. In United States ex rel.
Hetenyi v. Wilkins,2 8 the case on which the Ressler court based its decision,
a federal court held for the first time that a state reprosecution trans-
gressed federal constitutional limitations. In Hetenyi, the defendant was
indicted by a New York grand jury for first degree murder but was con-
19. Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (1909) ; Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902).
20. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
21. CONN. GN. STAT. RrV. § 6494 (1930) (now CONN. GFN. STAT. ANN. § 54-96
(1960)).
22. State v. Palko, 121 Conn. 669, 186 Atl. 657 (1936).
23. Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for the Court, posed the following question: "Is
that kind of double jeopardy to which the statute has subjected him a hardship so
acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it? Does it violate those 'funda-
mental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political
institutions'? ... The answer surely must be no." 302 U.S. at 328.
24. Id. at 322-23.
25. "What the answer would have to be if the state were permitted after a trial
free from error to try the accused over again or to bring another case against him,
we have no occasion to consider." Id. at 328. See generally Fisher, Double Jeopardy,
Two Sovereignties and the Intruding Constitution, 28 U. CM. L. Riv. 591, 595-97
(1961).
26. 359 U.S. 121 (1959). A state reprosecution was held permissible following
an acquittal in a federal prosecution for the same conduct, but the court's opinion indi-
cated that the fourteenth amendment's due process clause would bar a reprosecution
by the same sovereignty. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black held that the fifth
amendment bars a federal trial following either a state acquittal or conviction, and
whether or not the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is as binding on
the states as on the federal government, the state reprosecution of Bartkus violated
the fourteenth amendment standards expressed in Palko. Id. at 150.
27. 329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947) (concurring opinion of Frankfurter, J.). See United
States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913(1965), for the "double jeopardy history" of the due process clause.
28. 348 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 913 (1965). See 46 B.U.L. Rtv.
260 (1966); 40 ST. JOHN'S L. Rev. 292 (1966).
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victed of murder in the second degree. On appeal, the New York Supreme
Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial2 9 Tried again un-
der the original indictment, Hetenyi was found guilty of first degree mur-
der. Again, the conviction was reversed on appeal.80 For the third time,
Hetenyi was indicted for first degree murder and once again convicted of
murder in the second degree.31 His application for a writ of habeas corpus
was denied by the federal district court3 2 and on appeal from the denial
to the circuit court, it was held that the reprosecution for first degree
murder overstepped the limitations that the due process clause places on
the states notwithstanding that the defendant was twice successful on
appeals, and even though the third trial, as the first, resulted in a conviction
of second degree murder. 33
The court's reasoning in Hetenyi is premised on the proposition that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment places some limita-
tions on a state's power to reprosecute a defendant for the same crime . 4
Three possible standards are proposed for determining when a state re-
prosecution violates due process under the fourteenth amendment: (1)
the federal standard which assumes that the double jeopardy provision of
the fifth amendment would be absorbed in toto by the fourteenth amend-
ment under the doctrine of selective incorporation ;35 (2) the "basic core"
standard which assumes that not all of the fifth amendment double
jeopardy standards will be imposed on the states but only those constitut-
ing the "basic core" of the amendment through a restricted use of the
doctrine of selective incorporation ;86 and (3) the fundamental fairness
test which is unrelated to the doctrine of selective incorporation and,
in effect, rejects that doctrine favoring a qualified inquiry into the state
29. People v. Hetenyi, 277 App. Div. 310, 98 N.Y.S.2d 990, aff'd 301 N.Y. 757,
95 N.E.2d 819 (1950).
30. People v. Hetenyi, 304 N.Y. 80, 106 N.E.2d 20 (1952) (reversal was due to
an improper remark of the district attorney).
31. Aff'd per curiam, 282 App. Div. 1008, 125 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1953).
32. United States ex rel. Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 227 F. Supp. 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1964).
Certiorari had previously been denied by the United States Supreme Court, 375 U.S.
980 (1964).
33. 348 F.2d at 861-62. The court held that to the extent that §§ 464 and 544 of
the New York Code of Criminal Procedure provide for such a reprosecution they are
inconsistent with due process under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 863. N.Y. COD4
CRIM. PRoc. § 464 provides:
The granting of a new trial places the parties in the same position as if no
trial had been had. All the testimony must be produced anew; and the former
verdict cannot be used or referred to either in evidence or in argument.§ 544 provides:
When a new trial is ordered, it shall proceed in all respects as if no trial
had been had.
34. Id. at 849. See notes 26 and 27 supra and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 855. Under the doctrine of selective incorporation, certain provisions of
the Bill of Rights are absorbed by the fourteenth amendment and thereby made
applicable to the states. Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 73 YALz L.J. 74 (1963).
36. The court admits that there is a serious question whether the doctrine of
selective incorporation permits two levels of selection which process it describes as:
"... absorption of only those provisions of the Bill of Rights that are fundamental,
and then absorption of only that part of the provision that is fundamental, its basic
core." 348 F.2d at 854.
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reprosecution to determine if it is so fundamentally unfair as to violate
elemental due process. 37
The circuit court avoided choosing any particular standard on which
to rest the decision, but ruled that the reprosecution, under the given cir-
cumstances, had exceeded the federal constitutional limitations on a state's
power to reprosecute under all three standards. Green v. United States38
was used to illustrate both the federal and "basic core" standards since
"Green involved more than a 'subtle technical controversy' and the decision
rested on that aspect of the fifth amendment's double jeopardy provision
that must be ranked as fundamental. ' 39 The Palko v. Connecticut40 test,
adopted to determine whether the reprosecution was fundamentally un-
fair, dictated that since no "legitimate societal interest" existed which
would outweigh the hardships that a reprosecution would have on the ac-
cused, such reprosecution was impermissable.41
The court in the instant case placed heavy reliance on Hetenyi to
justify the reversal of New York precedents 42 and to propose that its
doctrine is the law of the land. Judge Van Voorhis reasoned that the
previously existing New York rule could co-exist with the federal rule
established by Green so long as the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment was not mandated on the states by the fourteenth amendment.
But, expounded Judge Van Voorhis, since Hetenyi holds that the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment imposes the rule of Green
upon the states, to reprosecute the defendant for second degree murder
would place him in jeopardy twice.43
The court, after discussing the Hetenyi decision, ruled that:
The holding [in Ressler] is not necessarily that the entire Fifth
Amendment is mandated on the States, but does extend to a determi-
nation that the situation here presented falls within the guarantee
against double jeopardy which was held to be a fundamental right
within the doctrine of selective incorporation, whereby certain guar-
37. Id. at 855.
38. 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
39. 348 F.2d at 856, referring to 355 U.S. at 198.
40. 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937). See note 23 supra.
41. 348 F.2d at 858. The court distinguishes the reprosecution in Palko from the
case before it on the ground that in Palko the reprosecution was allowed because the
state had been prejudiced by substantial legal error in failing to get a conviction for
the higher charge, but in Hetenyi the state simply failed to convict the defendant of
the higher crime. Id. at 860. See note 25 supra.
42. Under §§ 464 and 544 of the N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC., the New York courtshave held that if the defendant successfully appealed his conviction of the lesser degree
of a crime stated in the indictment, he could still be convicted of the greater degree.
Matter of Fiorillo v. Farrell, 16 N.Y.2d 678, 209 N.E.2d 290, 261 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1965) ;People v. Ercole, 4 N.Y.2d 617, 152 N.E.2d 7, 176 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1958). But if the
defendant does not appeal or is not successful on appeal he cannot be retried for thegreater charge. In this situation the jury's silence on the greater charge is held to
be equivalent of a verdict of not guilty of that charge. People v. McCarthy, 110 N.Y.
309, 314, 18 N.E. 128, 129 (1888).
43. People v. Ressler, 17 N.Y.2d 174, 180, 216 N.E.2d 582, 585, 269 N.Y.S.2d 414,
417 (1966).
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antees of the Bill of Rights are absorbed by the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and are thus made applicable to the
States.44
Moreover, although the denial of certiorari 45 by the Supreme Court in
the Hetenyi case does not indicate approval of that decision, the court
indicated that the cogency of the Second Circuit's reasoning, in addition
to recent Supreme Court decisions46 in related areas, demonstrate that
Hetenyi is the law of the land. 47 Judge Scileppi, concurring and dissent-
ing in part, urged against the reversal of prior New York law stating that
he was unpersuaded that Hetenyi represents the current Supreme Court
position on double jeopardy.48
Ressler appears to carry Hetenyi beyond the strict holding of that
case by deciding that the doctrine of selective incorporation applies to the
double jeopardy provision of the fifth amendment, since the court in
Hetenyi ruled that the reprosecution would be violative of the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause without reference to the fifth amendment
and declined to unequivocally adopt the position taken by the New York
court. Also, it is not clear from the court's opinion in Ressler whether
the fifth amendment's double jeopardy provision is absorbed in toto by
the due process clause, or whether it is just the "basic core" of that pro-
vision.
The issue of whether the fifth amendment's double jeopardy provision
is applicable to state court proceedings under the due process clause was
recently presented to the Supreme Court in Cichos v. Indiana on a writ
of certiorari. The issue was never reached, however, since the Court after
first granting the writ later dismissed it as improvidently granted.49 In
Cichos, the petitioner was tried in a lower state court of Indiana under a
44. Id. at 180, 216 N.E.2d at 585; 269 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
45. 383 U.S. 913 (1965).
46. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) ; Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378
U.S. 52 (1964) ; Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See note 3 supra.
47. 17 N.Y.2d at 181, 216 N.E.2d at 585, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 417 (1966). Concurringin the result in Ressler, Judge Burke rejects the holding that the double jeopardy
provision of the fifth amendment is applicable to the states, saying that such a reprose-
cution would violate the protection afforded the defendant by the New York state
constitution (art. 1, § 6), and that the result is called for ". . . as a natural develop-
ment in the quality of justice now accorded to the accused in this state." People v.
Ressler, supra at 181-82, 216 N.E.2d at 585-86, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 418 (concurring
opinion).
48. Citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) and Brantley v. Georgia,
217 U.S. 284 (1910). The Hetenyi court, in applying the federal standard and "basic
core" tests, holds that whatever precedential value Palko had was vitiated by Green v.
United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), and that although footnote 15 of the Green opinion
states that Brantley is not controlling since it involved a state trial, this was done to
distinguish Brantley, not approve of it. Under the fundamental fairness test, Brantley
was ruled not controlling, since it was decided under the spirit generated by Trono v.
United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905) which was diminished as authority by Green.
And finally, even if Brantley is interpreted as holding that reprosecution for the higher
offense is not so fundamentally unfair as to transgress the due process limitations of
the fourteenth amendment, the evolution of contemporary constitutional standards ofjustice and fairness would require not following it. 348 F.2d at 861-63.
49. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966).
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two-count affidavit charging him with reckless homicide and involuntary
manslaughter, and was convicted of reckless homicide. The verdict made
no mention of the involuntary manslaughter charge. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Indiana granted a new trial. 50 The petitioner was re-
tried on both counts, and again convicted of reckless homicide and sen-
tenced to one to five years imprisonment. The jury, once again, remained
silent as to the involuntary manslaughter charge. The Supreme Court of
Indianar' affirmed the conviction and rejected petitioner's argument that
his retrial on the involuntary manslaughter count subjected him to double
jeopardy in violation of the fifth amendment.
In dismissing the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted, the
Court indicated approval of the Supreme Court of Indiana's holding that
the offenses of reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter are statu-
torily52 treated as one offense with different penalties as opposed to possi-
bly viewing reckless homicide as an included offense in involuntary man-
slaughter. Therefore, no logical mandate exists to necessarily treat the
jury's silence in regard to the involuntary manslaughter charge as an
acquittal of that offense, but rather, the better reasoning would be to hold
that reckless homicide encompasses the elements of involuntary man-
slaughter and petitioner was merely given the lesser penalty.5 3 In a con-
curring opinion, Mr. Justice Black adhered to his earlier views stated in
Bartkus v. Illinois5 4 that, "the Fourteenth Amendment makes the double
jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment applicable to the States." 55
Mr. Justice Fortas, with whom the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas
joined, dissented on the ground that the fourteenth amendment's due
process provision should be interpreted to prohibit the state's reprosecu-
tion of the petitioner, reasoning that if Cichos were a federal case the
reprosecution would have violated the federal standard enunciated in
Green.5 6
Thus, whether the New York court has correctly divined5 7 the cur-
rent position of the Supreme Court is for the present unresolved, and
50. 243 Ind. 187, 184 N.E.2d 1 (1962).
51. 208 N.E.2d 685 (1965).
52. IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2002 (1965). The statutory penalty for involuntary
manslaughter is two to twenty-one years imprisonment whereas the penalty for reck-
less homicide is one to five years imprisonment. IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-3405 (1965)
(involuntary manslaughter) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2001(a) (1965) (reckless
homicide).
53. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966).
54. 359 U.S. 121, 150 (1959) (dissenting opinion).
55. Cichos v. Indiana, 385 U.S. 76 (1966). In his dissenting opinion in Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947), Mr. Justice Black states that the original pur-
pose of the fourteenth amendment was to make the Bill of Rights applicable to
the states.
56. 332 U.S. at 80.
57. In Commonwealth ex rel. Montgomery v. Myers, 422 Pa. 180, 220 A.2d 859
(1966), the Pennsylvania court avoided anticipating the Court's answer on the ques-
tion of whether or not the fifth amendment's double jeopardy provision is mandated
on the states, by stating that, even if it were, no transgression occurred under the
circumstances there present. But see State v. Farmer, 48 N.J. 145, 224 A.2d 481
(1966) (dictum).
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what tack the Court will eventually take on the double jeopardy issue is
still uncertain. The Court could avoid overruling its decision in Palko
by using the fundamental fairness test coupled with "basic core" stand-
ards. 58 However, if the Court chooses to employ the doctrine of selective
incorporation, all of the rights afforded by the double jeopardy clause
would pass to defendants in state prosecutions.59 If so, the Court would
invoke the federal standard and Palko would fall. 0°
Harry Sam Himes
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - PROSECUTION'S NEGLI-
GENT NONDISCLOSURE OF CREDIBILITY EVIDENCE REQUIRES REVERSAL
IF ITS INTRODUCTION WOULD HAVE ALLOWED TRIER OF FACT TO
ENTERTAIN A REASONABLE DOUBT.
Levin v. Katzenbach (D.C. Cir. 1966)
Appellant was charged with grand larceny on an indictment alleging
a conspiracy to effect the corrupt acquittal of a union official being tried
for perjury. He allegedly retained union funds given to him for use in
"fixing" the official's trial. Following his conviction for grand larceny'
and a subsequent affirmance by the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit,2 appellant filed the present petition for
habeas corpus or a new trial, alleging that he had recently discovered
evidence that had been in the government's possession at time of trial but
was not disclosed to the jury.8
58. The Court could reason that to deprive an individual of a right which is funda-
mental to a provision in the Bill of Rights, would violate the fundamental fairness test
established in Palko. Note, 46 B.U.L. Rzv. 260, 266 n.34 (1966). See notes 23 and 36
supra and accompanying text.
59. Henkin, supra note 35, at 79.
60. Adoption of the federal standard would mean that the fifth amendment's doublejeopardy clause would be applied to the states in toto. Such a position would be in-
compatible with Palko, which held that under some circumstances, the double jeopardy
standards that are applicable under the fifth amendment are not applicable to the states.
46 B.U.L. Ryv. 260 (1966).
1. At the trial, the testimony of government witnesses was inconsistent as to the
alleged time when the money was given to the appellant and subsequently exchanged
for bills of a smaller denomination. The contradictions and inconsistencies in the testi-
mony were primary factors in appellant's defense.
2. Levin v. United States, 338 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
999 (1965).
3. The newly discovered evidence included a statement obtained prior to the trial
from a bank officer, revealing that while he recalled cashing the union's check for
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The district court dismissed the petition, concluding as a matter of
law that: "Petitioner has failed to prove his allegation that trial counsel
deliberately suppressed evidence. ' 4 Appealing from the dismissal, appel-
lant urged that the district court erred by limiting itself solely to a con-
sideration of the question of deliberate suppression. The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Burger dis-
senting, reversed and remanded, holding that the appellant was entitled
to relief if the prosecution had failed to disclose evidence, which in the
context of the case, might have allowed the jury to entertain a reasonable
doubt about appellant's guilt. Characterizing such a failure to disclose as
negligence, the court directed that on remand the district court should
conduct a hearing to determine whether the government was negligent
within this standard and to grant or deny appellant's writ in accordance
with its determination. Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
The activities of a prosecuting attorney which will vitiate a criminal
conviction have ranged from the deliberate use of perjured testimony, 5 or
the failure to correct testimony known to be false,6 to the intentional sup-
pression of exculpatory evidence. 7 While the issue confronting the court
in the instant case was one concerning the negligent suppression of evi-
dence, the principles relied on to condemn such suppression may be traced
to the earlier development of the prosecutor's duty to refrain from solicit-
ing or condoning perjured testimony.
In Mooney v. Holohan,8 the United States Supreme Court recognized
that the deliberate use of perjured testimony by the prosecution comprised
state action inconsistent with the fundamental demands of justice and
violative of the fourteenth amendment. The Mooney rationale was sub-
sequently extended to unsolicited false testimony which was allowed to
pass uncorrected, 9 as well as testimony relevant only to the defendant's
sentence. 10 In addition to providing the basis for the exclusion of perjured
testimony, Mooney also proved to be the foundation upon which later
courts protected an accused from the injustice inherent in the prosecu-
tion's deliberate suppression of exculpatory evidence. This development
$35,000 in one thousand dollar bills he had no recollection of a later exchange of these
bills for bills of a smaller denomination. (This statement could have been of import-
ance in challenging the credibility of the government witnesses.) The prosecution
never called this officer as a witness at the trial, and appellant's attorney was never
informed of the contents of the statement.
4. Levin v. Katzenbach, 249 F. Supp. 225, 229 (D.D.C. 1965).
5. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) ; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942)
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
6. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
7. United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953).
8. 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
9. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
10. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
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was foreshadowed by the Court in Pyle v. Kansas" when it cited Mooney
as authority in holding that a petitioner had been deprived of rights guar-
anteed by the federal constitution if "... his imprisonment resulted from
perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State authorities to obtain his
conviction, and from the deliberate suppression by those same authorities
of evidence favorable to him.' 2 After Pyle it was but another step to
decisions that the intentional withholding of evidence material to the issue
of guilt or sentence would alone constitute a denial of due process.' 3
In 1963 the Supreme Court consolidated and adopted the reasoning
behind this expansion of the prosecutor's duties to insure justice and fair
play.1 4 In Brady v. Maryland,15 the Court expressed its opinion as follows:
We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or punishment, irrespective. of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.'l
In so holding, the Court not only demanded disclosure of evidence
favorable to the accused, but also noted that due process was violated
whether or not the suppression was "the result of guile.' 7 7 The Court
expressly declared that the relief granted was not based on a desire to
reprimand the prosecution for reprehensible conduct, but instead on a
desire to avoid an unfair trial to the accused.' 8
The recent development of the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence
to the accused, formulated in terms of due process requirements, can also
11. 317 U.S. 213 (1942).
12. Id. at 216. (Emphasis added.)
13. See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir. 1955);
United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir. 1952).
14. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), wherein Mr. Justice Suther-
land discussed the complex duties of the prosecuting attorney:
The United States attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor - indeed, he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful convic-
tion as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88.
15. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
16. Id. at 87. (Emphasis added.)
17. Id. at 88.
18. Id. at 87; Compare the opinion written by Judge Friendly in Kyle v. United
States, 297 F.2d 507 (1961), wherein he warns that the courts should not forget their
role in protecting the integrity of the judicial system:
Sometimes only a small showing of prejudice, or none, is demanded because that
interest is reinforced by the necessity that "The administration of justice must
not only be above reproach, it must also be beyond the suspicion of reproach,"[People v. Savvides] and by the teaching of experience that mere admonitions
are insufficient to prevent repetition of abuse. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
650-53.
Id. at 514. (Footnotes modified.)
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be realistically construed as a judicial effort to alleviate the inadequacies
evident in present legislative provisions for discovery in criminal cases.' 9
Following the Supreme Court's decision in Jencks v. United States,20 in
which the Court recognized the. defendant's right to inspect written rec-
ords containing statements made by two government witnesses to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Congress passed the Jencks Act.2 1 Evi-
dently disturbed by what it considered "widespread misinterpretations and
popular misunderstandings of the opinion in the Jencks case, ' 22 Congress
promulgated the Act to "protect individual rights during criminal prosecu-
tions and to protect confidential information in the possession of the Gov-
ernment. 23 The legislation gave a rather limited discovery device to the
accused, and denied any rights to discovery under the act until the witness
had actually testified at the trial.24
Faced with these inadequacies in the accused's rights to discovery,
the courts have approached the problem from another direction. Instead
of enlarging the accused's rights of discovery, they enlarged the prose-
cutor's duty to disclose, and the instant case is an example of the difficul-
ties inherent in such an approach to the problems of criminal discovery.
In Levin, the court was presented with the problem of negligent non-
disclosure of evidence by the prosecution. 25 Because the evidence in ques-
tion could have cast doubt on the credibility of testimony used to secure
the appellant's conviction, 26 the court adopted the standard enunciated by
the Supreme Court in Griffin v. United States27 that relief should be
granted if an appellate court should conclude that the jury could have
"attached significance to the evidence favorable to the defendant had the
evidence been before it.' 82  Also, because it was not necessary to show
any willful suppression by the prosecution, 29 the court reasoned that neg-
ligent nondisclosure of such evidence could be sufficiently detrimental to
19. See Traynor, Ground Lost And Found In Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.
Riv. 228, 242-43 (1964).
20. 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1958).
22. S. Rep. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 1862 (1957).
23. Ibid.
24. Subsection (a) of the act provides:
In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States, no statement or
report in the possession of the United States which was made by a Government
witness or prospective Government witness (other than the defendant) to an
agent of the Government shall be subject to subpoena, discovery, or inspection
until said witness has testified on direct examination in the trial of the case.
[Emphasis added.]
25. The defense did not request divulgence of the information in question, and
although the rule of Brady was formulated in terms of a request, subsequent decisions
have shown that a request is not a prerequisite to the duty to disclose. E.g., United
States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 137 (2d Cir. 1964).
26. See notes I and 3 supra.
27. 336 U.S. 704 (1949).
28. Id. at 709.
29. See United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir.
1961).
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the accused to result in a denial of due process.80 At this point, however,
the court extended its decision by noting that this negligent nondisclosure
could serve as the basis for relief, irrespective of the lack of diligence or
competence of the defendant's trial counsel. 31 It is this reasoning that most
troubled the dissent,3 2 and justifiably so, for such an approach exemplifies
the inherent confusion that can result when the basic rationale behind the
due process qualifications of disclosure are ignored.
Although the early development of the duty to disclose evidence was
colored by a desire to control the activities of the state and its prosecutor, 33
there should be little doubt that today the concern is for the possible denial
of the accused's constitutional right to a fair trial. 34 The court recognizes
that the due process clause does not demand a trial that is perfect in every
respect, for the accused would not be entitled to relief if his counsel actu-
ally knew the facts in question,3 5 or he was unable to show due diligence.36
Realizing these limitations on the due process remedies, and the inadequate
statutory procedures for discovery, the court unfortunately returns to an
emphasis on the activities of the prosecutor 37 by stating that his negligent
nondisclosure will vitiate the conviction even if the evidence could have
been introduced to the court through another channel - the defendant's
counsel.
Due process requires that an accused be assured a fair trial. To help
insure this result, our system has placed certain burdens on the prosecu-
tion. However, it should not be forgotten that an additional method of
insuring fairness has been guaranteed. This is the right to competent
counsel.38 If evidence is not introduced at trial because the accused does
30. See Ashley v. Texas, 319 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1963).
31. The court expressed its position as follows:
But appellant's claim for relief based upon a breach of the prosecutor's duty of
disclosure challenges the fairness, and therefore the validity, of the proceedings,
and relief, either on a motion for a new trial or for habeas corpus, may not depend
on whether more able, diligent or fortunate counsel might possibly have come
upon the evidence on his own.
363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966). (Emphasis added.)
32. Judge Burger vehemently asserted: "No court I know of has ever invalidated
a conviction because of the prosecutor's nondisclosure of evidence when the evidence
was equally available to the accused." Id. at 293.
33. See Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Note, The Prosecu-
tor's Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136 (1964).
34. See notes 17 and 18 supra.
35. 363 F.2d 287, 291 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
36. To obtain a new trial because of newly discovered evidence (1) the evidence
must have been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the new trial must
show diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (3) the
evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be
material to the issues involved; and (5) of such nature that in a new trial it would
probably produce an acquittal.
Thompson v. United States, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
37. See note 31 supra.
38. The court notes the fact that the accused's trial counsel actually interviewed
the bank official in an effort to discover whether the bank kept numbers of their $1,000
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not have adequate counsel, then this inadequacy of representation should
be recognized as the basis for concluding that the accused has not re-
ceived a trial that meets the standards of due process. Being seemingly re-
luctant to consider this approach to the problem, and realizing that the
accused's statutory right to obtain evidence was woefully limited,3 9 the
court granted relief by placing an unreasonably heavy burden of disclosure
on the prosecution. In doing so, it is suggested that Levin has saddled
the prosecutor with the unrealistic burden of exploring his entire deposi-
tory of trial preparation for information possibly useful to the accused.
In this exploration, the prosecutor will be "guided" by a standard
requiring the disclosure of "evidence which, in the context of this case,
might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt about appellant's
guilt."' 40 Herein is found the predicament now visited upon prosecutors.
He may exercise all the diligence and ingenuity his abilities and principles
can muster and still be found "negligent" if a reviewing court feels that
some evidence in his possession "might" have led the trier of fact to en-
tertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.41 The prosecutor's
duty, as defined by Levin, is made all the more burdensome by withholding
from him the right to assume that the accused will have adequate repre-
sentation.
42
James D. Hutchinson
bills. However, when counsel learned of the alleged exchange of the $1,000 bills for
twenties, he failed to further question the official and hence was unaware of the
latter's lack of recollection of this subsequent exchange. In commenting on these
circumstances in his dissenting opinion, Judge Burger noted:
In short, if the prosecution can be called "negligent" for not telling the defense
what McCeney had said, what are we to say of defense counsel's conduct in not
ascertaining the same facts from McCeney when he interviewed him?
I suggest that the majority holding is a thinly disguised holding that defense
counsel gave Appellant ineffective assistance in failing to call McCeney as a
witness, and in the future I shall regard this case as holding nothing more
than that.
363 F.2d 287, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
39. See note 24 supra.
40. 363 F.2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
41. The difficulties of measuring up to this standard are exemplified by Judge
Burger's closing comment in his dissenting opinion:
Had I been the prosecutor here, I confess that nothing in my 30 years' experi-
ence in litigation would have alerted me to any need or "duty" to call up opposing
counsel and compare notes with him on whether the particular witness had told
both litigants the same facts.
363 F.2d 287, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
42. Although a comprehensive system of criminal discovery analogous to that
afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in civil litigation, would undoubtedly
be a more realistic approach to the problem of discovery and disclosure than a case by
case interpretation of the rights and duties involved, the Supreme Court at present has
granted certiorari on a case that could prove an appropriate vehicle for a consideration
of these problems in anticipation of the more desirable approach of a system of com-
prehensive rules. See State v. Giles, 239 Md. 458, 212 A.2d 101 (1965), cert. granted,
383 U.S. 941 (1966). See generally Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal
Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 226 (1964).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - LOYALTY OATHS - A STATE LOYALTY
OATH STATUTE WHICH FAILS To REQUIRE, AS PART OF THE MEM-
BERSHIP CLAUSE, SPECIFIC INTENT To FURTHER THE ILLEGAL ENDS
OF THE PROSCRIBED ORGANIZATIONS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Elfbrandt v. Russell (U.S. 1966)
As a prerequisite to state employment, an Arizona statute required
that all public officers and employees subscribe to a loyalty oath.' The oath
was supplemented by a provision which subjected to a perjury prosecu-
tion those taking the oath who knowingly become or remain members of
a subversive organization having knowledge of the unlawful purpose of
the organization.2 Petitioner, a school teacher and a Quaker, alleging the
statute to be unconstitutional, objected to subscribing to the oath and
brought an action for declaratory relief. The Arizona Supreme Court
upheld the oath and accompanying statutory gloss.3 The Supreme Court
of the United States vacated the judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration in the light of Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) .4
On reconsideration the Supreme Court of Arizona reinstated the original
judgment.5 Certiorari was granted and the United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding, in a five-four decision, the statute unconstitutional for
failure to require, as part of the membership clause, specific intent to
further the illegal ends of the proscribed organizations. Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
Following World War II and during the ensuing cold war, numerous
state legislatures, aspiring to enhance and preserve security, have enacted
1. I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution and laws of the State of Arizona; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and defend them against all enemies,
foreign and domestic, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties
of the office of (name of office) according to the best of my ability, so help me
God (or so do I affirm). (signature of officer or employee.)
ARIZ. Riv. STAT. ANN. § 38-231 (G) (Supp. 1965).
2. ARIZ. RXv. STAT. ANN. § 38-231(E) (Supp. 1965). Subdivision E provides in
pertinent part:
Any officer or employee . . . having taken the form of oath or affirmation
prescribed by this section, and . . . [who] during such term of office or employ-
ment knowingly and wilfully becomes or remains a member of the communist
party of the United States or its successors or any of its subordinate organizations
or any other organization having for one of its purposes the overthrow by force
or violence of the government of the state of Arizona . . . [having] knowledge
of [the] . . . unlawful purpose of [the] . . . organization . . . shall be . .. subject
to all the penalties for perjury. ...
For the purposes of the above section, the term officer or employee means every
employee of the state or of any local government within the state. See ARIZ. Riv.
STAT. ANN. § 38-231(B) (Supp. 1965). Throughout this note, the term "subversive
organization" will refer to one which advocates the overthrow by force or violence of
the government of the state or any of its political subdivisions.
3. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 94 Ariz. 1, 381 P.2d 554 (1963).
4. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 378 U.S. 127 (1964). In Bag gett, two loyalty oaths of
the state of Washington were struck down as unconstitutionally vague.
5. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 97 Ariz. 140, 397 P.2d 944 (1964). The Arizona Supreme
Court asserted that the Arizona statute was not afflicted with the uncertainties which
characterized the Washington oaths.
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loyalty oath statutes designed to ensure loyalty in public employees by
excluding from public employment those unwilling to swear to non-mem-
bership in a subversive organization. 6 The Arizona statute is, in many ways,
typical of those which have been before the Supreme Court in the past
one and one-half decades. 7
The Court in Elf brandt, however, advanced a new and significant
proposition by holding that a state loyalty oath statute which proscribes
"mere knowing membership [in a subversive organization], without any
showing of 'specific intent' [of assisting in achieving the unlawful ends of
the organization], would run afoul of the Constitution .... ,,8 To sustain
the validity of the newly formulated "specific intent" test, the majority
cited Aptheker v. Secretary of State,9 Noto v. United States,10 and
Scales v. United States."
Mr. Justice White, dissenting, asserted that neither the "specific in-
tent" test nor the cases cited by the majority to sustain the validity of the
test was applicable to the instant issue.' 2 The reasoning of the dissent is
depicted in the following triparte analysis: (1) a state may condition
public employment upon employee abstention from knowing membership
in a subversive organization;13 (2) one obtaining public employment by
falsifying his qualifications may be subject to a perjury prosecution;14
(3) therefore, a state loyalty oath statute is constitutional which proscribes
knowing membership in a subversive organization providing criminal
sanctions for those who swear falsely regarding their loyalty.' 5 Under-
pinning Mr. Justice White's position is the case of Adler v. Board of
6. The enactment of such legislation has been traditional in times of great stress.
During the Reconstruction period after the Civil War a wealth of statutes were passed
both by the states and Congress requiring oaths of past loyalty of adherents of the
Confederate cause. In litigation following this legislation the Supreme Court con-
demned the challenged oaths as both ex post facto laws and as bills of attainder.
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333 (1867). While restrictions on speech and association were imposed
during and after World War I, there was a distinct absence of loyalty oaths.
7. It should be noted that specific criminal sanctions were not embodied within
the early loyalty oath statutes during this period; however, all of the statutes examined
by the Court in the eight years preceding Elfbrandt contained perjury provisions
similar to that of the Arizona statute. See also notes 41 and 42 infra and accom-
panying text.
8. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16 (1966). (Emphasis added.) The Con-
stitution provides that "Congress shall make no law . .. abridging the freedom of
speech .... or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
9. 378 U.S. 500 (1964) (construing provision of Subversive Activities Control
Act of 1950 making it unlawful for a communist to obtain a passport).
10. 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (construing membership clause of Smith Act making
it unlawful to join a subversive organization).
11. 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (construing membership clause of Smith Act making it
unlawful to join a subversive organization).
12. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 22 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
13. Id. at 19. To support this tenet the minority cites numerous cases including
the following: Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Garner v. Board of
Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) ; Gerende v. Board of Supervisors, 341 U.S. 56(1951). The minority asserts further that if upon state inquiry into such membership,
an employee refuses to affirm or deny his affiliations, he may be discharged. 384 U.S.
at 19-20.
14. Id. at 20-21 & n.1.
15. Id. at 21.
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Educ.16 An examination of pertinent decisions prior and subsequent to
Adler will be instructive in determining whether the. minority's reliance on
that case was misplaced.
Adler upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which provided
that knowing membership in a subversive organization is prima facie
ground for disqualification from employment in the public schools.' 7 The
decision is grounded upon two propositions: (1) public employment is a
privilege, rather than a right ;18 and (2) governmental interest in acquir-
ing fit and loyal employees outweighs any incidental restrictive effect on
the employees' rights of free speech and assembly.'? Regarding the first
proposition, it must be noted that the "privilege" concept of public em-
ployment is no longer accepted unqualifiedly.20 Furthermore, the sole
decision found by the Court in Adler to support its second theory was
Garner v. Board of Pub. Works2' which offers little authority since there
judgment was expressly reserved as to "whether the [public authority]
may determine that an employee's disclosure of [Communist Party] politi-
cal affiliation justifies his discharge. 12 2 Garner held only that a munici-
pality may inquire of its employees "as to matters that may prove relevant
to their fitness and suitability for the public service. '23 In addition, no
question was there raised as to the effect of such an inquiry on the right
of free speech and assembly. Nor have decisions following Adler adopted
its reasoning. In fact, many of these decisions appear to weaken that case
while coincidentally lending support to the holding in the instant case.
In Wieman v. Updegraff,24 the Court held that a state loyalty oath,
not requiring proof of scienter, violated due process by excluding persons
from public employment "solely on the basis of organizational member-
ship, regardless of their knowledge concerning the organizations to which
they had belonged. '2 5 The importance of this decision to the present dis-
cussion is the analysis adopted by the Court. There it was indicated that
the Court will review state imposed limitations on public employment to
determine their rational relationship to fitness for the employment sought.
16. 342 U.S. 485 (1952). See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 20 (1966) (dis-
senting opinion).
17. Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
18. Id. at 492. See also United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
19. 342 U.S. at 493. In that case, the Court reasoned that should a person bedisqualified from employment because of membership in a subversive organization, he
is not thereby denied his first amendment rights. "His freedom of choice between
membership in the organization and employment . .. might be limited, but not hisfreedom of speech or assembly, except in the remote sense that limitation is inherent
in every choice." Ibid.
20. We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employ-
ment exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to
the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is patently arbitrary or
discriminatory.
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952); see also Schware v. Board of
Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
21. 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
22. Id. at 720.
23. Id. at 720. (Emphasis added.)
24. 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
25. Id. at 190.
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The next case important to the present analysis, and possibly the most
significant, is Speiser v. Randall.2 6 There the Court held it unconstitu-
tional to require an applicant for a tax exemption to maintain the burden
of proving that he did not advocate the unlawful overthrow of the gov-
ernment. 27 It has been suggested that the Court in conferring a preferred
position upon first amendment rights, 28 has intended Speiser to overrule,
sub silentio, the holding in Adler that mere knowing membership in a sub-
versive organization is prima facie ground for disqualification from pub-
lic employment.29 The Court's shift in attitude in Speiser, concerning the
extent to which a state may proceed when the state's procedures interfere
with an individual's first amendment freedoms, is further evidenced by
Shelton v. Tucker.30 Although acknowledging a state's unquestioned right
to inquire into the competency of its employees, the Court held that when
the state's end can be achieved through alternative methods, unoffensive
to the first amendment, an employee should not be compelled to disclose
every organization to which he has belonged or contributed during the
preceding five years.3 1
The two loyalty oath cases which immediately preceded Elfbrandt
further indicate the Court's intense concern for freedom of speech and
association, interests accorded only cursory consideration in Adler.3 1 In
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction,33 a unanimous Court established a
new boundary for loyalty oaths by holding a statute unconstitutionally
vague on the ground that its terms were not "susceptible of objective
26. 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
27. Id. at 529. Since the entire statutory procedure violated the requirements of
due process, applicants were not obliged to subscribe to a loyalty oath which was the
first step in the invalid procedure.
28. The vice of the present procedure is that, where particular speech falls close
to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken fact
finding . . . will create the danger that the legitimate utterance will be penalized.
The man who knows that he must bring forth proof and persuade another of the
lawfulness of his conduct must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the
State must bear these burdens.
Id. at 526. Cf., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509-10 (1948); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940).
29. See A. Morris, Academic Freedom and Loyalty Oaths, 28 LAw & CONTMP.
PROa. 487, 505 (1963). Compare the statement in the instant case that disqualification
for mere knowing membership constitutes "a conclusive presumption that the member
shares the unlawful aims of the organization." Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11,
17 (1966).
30. 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
31. Id. at 488-90.
The objectionable quality of... overbreadth ... [is] the danger of tolerating,
in the area of First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute
susceptible of sweeping and improper application. . . . The threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions.
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966) [quoting from NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)]. Cf., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940);
Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) ; Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444, 451 (1938).
32. See note 19 supra.
33. 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
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measurement. '34 The Court, quoting from Smith v. California,3 5 adhered
to the proposition that "stricter standards of permissible statutory vague-
ness may be applied to a statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on
speech; a man may be less required to act at his peril here, because the
free dissemination of ideas may be the loser."36 In Baggett v. Bullitt3 7
the Court, relying on Cramp, struck down an oath as unconstitutionally
vague although the statute in Baggett required an oath of much narrower
scope.38 In addition, Baggett adds to the vagueness doctrine that an oath
cannot be cast in such terms so as to create a hazard of subjecting an
affiant to a perjury prosecution for "knowing but guiltless behavior. '39
The foregoing chronicle of cases indicates that the Supreme Court
has countenanced the following doctrines: (1) any state imposed limita-
tion on public employment which bears no rational relationship to fitness
will be invalidated; (2) first amendment rights stand in a preferred posi-
tion which prohibits a procedure which conclusively presumes the unlaw-
fulness of an employee's activity involving the exercise of free speech and
assembly; (3) the state may not stifle first amendment guarantees when
its objective can be more narrowly achieved; (4) the terms of a loyalty
oath statute must be susceptible of objective measurement; and, (5) the
state may not punish knowing but guiltless behavior.
These doctrines enfeebled the authoritative value of Adler and fur-
nished a mandate for the adoption by the majority of the "specific intent"
test. They furnished precedent for the Court to declare that it no longer
regarded knowing membership in a subversive organization, in itself, as
bearing a rational relationship to fitness for public employment,40 particu-
larly in a situation where an employee's first amendment rights are deemed
to outweigh the state's right to condition public employment. More-
over, the "specific intent" test provides an adequate guideline by which to
measure the permissible scope of a loyalty oath statute by effectively con-
struing such nebulous criteria as "more narrowly achieved," "susceptible
of objective measurement," and "knowing but guiltless behavior."
Whether or not the "specific intent" test will be applied to every loyalty
oath statute embodying a membership clause, and whether or not the specter
34. Id. at 286. See generally Note, The Void-For-Vagueness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. Rv. 67 (1960). The former test for unconstitutional
vagueness for loyalty oaths, established in American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,339 U.S. 382, 413 (1950), was based on mere presence or absence of scienter. See
also text accompanying note 25 supra.
35. 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
36. Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 287 (1961).
37. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
38. Id. at 364-65 nn.3 & 4. Compare Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368
U.S. 278, 279 n.1 (1961).
39. Id. at 373. Also significant to the present analysis is that the language of theBaggett oath focused solely upon subversive acts. It is, therefore, reasonable to read
Baggett to mean that a loyalty oath statute which proscribes less than direct participa-
tion in subversive acts would be unconstitutional. Such a reading would render in-
evitable the ultimate adoption of the "specific intent" test.40. Compare the language of the Court in the instant case in text accompanying
note 48 infra.
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of Adler will reappear to haunt the Court remain unanswered. It is con-
ceivable that Elfbrandt will be applied only to those statutes which, like the
Arizona statute, provide criminal sanctions for those who swear falsely
regarding their loyalty.41 However, it seems reasonable to conclude that
inasmuch as a person obtaining public employment by falsifying his qualifi-
cations may subject himself to a perjury prosecution absent such a provision
in the oath statute,42 such absence would not compel an abandonment of
the "specific intent" test.
Noting that the instant statute prohibits membership in an organiza-
tion "having for one of its purposes" the overthrow of the government,
4 3
it is feasible to interpret Elfbrandt to mean that the "specific intent" test
will be applied only when the proscribed organizations embrace legal as
well as illegal aims; but if the proscribed organizations embrace exclusive-
ly illegal aims, 44 the "scienter" test will obtain.45 Similarly, the statute in
question required every public officer and employee within the state to
subscribe to the oath.4 6 Therefore, it is arguable that the Court may
decide, despite earlier indications to the contrary, that mere knowing mem-
bership in a subversive organization, in itself, bears a rational relationship
to fitness for public employment as to certain officers or employees - for
example, those holding positions through which they might be capable of
threatening the public interest.4 7 If the Court were to adopt such an atti-
tude, a statute requiring an oath taken only by such individuals would not
be governed by Elfbrandt.
41. It appears that the dissent would so limit the holding in the instant case. See
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 20-23 (1966) (dissenting opinion). See also
note 7 supra.
42. See Id. at 20-21 & n.1.
43. See note 2 supra.
44. Assuming, arguendo, that such organizations do exist.
45. Compare Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229 (1961) ; see Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 97 Ariz. 140, 146, 397 P.2d 944, 949 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
46. See note 2 supra.
47. A case which would appear to support such an argument is American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). Section 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley
Act [61 Stat. 143 (1947)] required that labor union officers file with the National
Labor Relations Board affidavits denying affiliation with or belief in a subversive
organization. Non-compliance resulted in their union being placed under a complete
disability to assert rights relating to representation, union-shops and unfair labor
practices. In holding that the membership provision was not violative of the first
amendment the Court stated that:
Congress could rationally find that the Communist Party is not like other
political parties in its utilization of positions of union leadership as means by
which to bring about strikes and other obstructions of commerce for purposes of
political advantage, and that many people who believe in overthrow of the Govern-
ment by force and violence are also likely to resort to such tactics when, as officers,
they formulate union policy.
The fact that the statute identifies persons by their political affiliations and
beliefs, which are circumstances ordinarily irrelevant to permissible subjects of
government action, does not lead to the conclusion that such circumstances are
never relevant.
Id. at 391.
Interestingly enough, particularly in relation to the text accompanying notes 48-50
infra, § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act was repealed in 1959. 73 Stat. 525 (1959), 29
U.S.C. § 159(h) (1965).
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It is submitted, however, that Elf brandt will not be construed so nar-
rowly, but that the "specific intent" test will apply to every employee re-
quired to subscribe to any loyalty oath containing a membership clause.
The primary concern of the Court in the present action was to ensure the
preferred position of first amendment freedoms. The Court concluded
that these freedoms may not be limited by any loyalty statute which pro-
scribes less than "specific conduct [which constitutes] . . . a clear and
present danger to ... the State. ' 48 The Court further declared that "those
who join an organization but do not share its unlawful purposes and do
not participate in its unlawful activities surely pose no threat, either as
citizens or as public employees. ' 49 Such reasoning would seem to govern
every oath statute embracing a membership clause and would appear to
be as applicable to the chief executive of the state as it is to the state's
lowliest employee. Underlying this reasoning, perhaps, is the Court's
acknowledgment that a forced loyalty oath fails in its purported purpose
of ensuring loyalty among public employees.50
Barry Ackerman
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SEARCH AND SEIZURE - CLOTHING
HELD To BE IMMUNE FROM SEARCH AND SEIZURE AS MERE
EVIDENCE OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY.
Hayden v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary
(4th Cir. 1966)
Following his conviction in a Maryland state court for armed robbery,
petitioner filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District
Court for the District of Maryland. The petitioner alleged that his arrest
was illegal, that the search of his home incident thereto was unreasonable,'
and that the seizure of several articles of clothing discovered by the police
in the course of the search was improper since these items constituted
48. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966) [quoting from Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 311 (1940)].
49. Id. at 17.
50. See Byse, A Report on the Pennsylvania Loyalty Act, 101 U. PA. L. Rzv. 480,
484 (1953). See text accompanying note 6 supra. It should be noted that Solicitor
General Thurgood Marshall has decided not to appeal a federal court decision in
California that held unconstitutional the non-Communist disclaimer provision in the
Medicare Law, stating that Elfbrandt "forecloses any argument that the challenged
provision is constitutional." N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1967, p. 26, col. 6.
1. The procedural issues raised in the petition will not be considered since the
scope of this note is limited to a discussion of the "mere evidence" rule.
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only mere evidence of criminal activity.2 In denying the writ, the district
court found the arrest to have been legitimate and the search and seizure
to have been reasonable.3 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, although
concurring with the district court on the issues of the legality of the
arrest and the reasonableness of the search, held that the case must be
remanded and a federal writ of habeas corpus issued since the seizure of
the clothing violated the "mere evidence" rule.4 Hayden v. Warden of
Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 385 U.S.
926 (1966).
The historical inception of the "mere evidence" rule is found in
Boyd v. United States,5 the first case that thoroughly considered un-
reasonable search and seizure within the context of the fourth amend-
ment.6 In Boyd, the principal issue before the Court was whether or not
the compulsory production of a man's private papers was an unreasonable
search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment.7 The
2. A uniform consisting of a pair of trousers and a jacket was seized. Witnesses
had observed the felon fleeing from the robbery scene attired in the uniform. The
prosecution offered the uniform as evidence at the trial for identification purposes.
Hayden v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 363 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1966).
3. The court was of the opinion that search of the petitioner's home, during which
the uniform was discovered, was narrower in scope than the thorough five hour search
which the Supreme Court tolerated in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
Hayden v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, supra note 2, at 651. For the federal
standard of reasonableness which must govern a search incident to arrest see United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4. The "mere evidence" rule is enunciated in a trilogy of Supreme Court cases.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) :
[S]earch warrants . . . may not be used as the means of gaining access to a
man's house or office and papers solely for the purpose of making a search to
secure evidence to be used against him in a criminal or penal proceeding, but they
may be resorted to only when a primary right to such search and seizure may be
found in the interest which the public or the complainant may have in the property
to be seized, or in the right to possession of it, or when a valid exercise of police
power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides
that it may be taken.
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932)
The decisions of this court distinguish searches of one's house, office, papers or
effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime from searches such as those
made to find stolen goods for return to the owner, to take property that has been
forfeited to the government, to discover property concealed to avoid payment of
duties for which it is liable, and from searches such as those made for seizure of
counterfeit coins, burglar's tools, gambling paraphernalia, and illicit liquor in
order to prevent the commission of crime.
Harris v. United States, supra note 3, at 154:
This court has frequently recognized the distinction between merely evidentiary
material, on the one hand, which may not be seized either under the authority of
a search warrant or during the course of a search incident to an arrest, and on
the other hand, those objects which may validly be seized including the instru-
mentalities and means by which a crime is committed, the fruits of crime, such as
stolen property, weapons by which escape of the person arrested might be effected,
and property the possession of which is a crime.
5. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
6. For an historical analysis of the development of the fourth amendment see
Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable Search And Seizure - A Second Class Con-
stitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 262-76 (1950).
7. Boyd v. United States, supra note 5, at 622.
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Court held that it was and, relying upon an interrelation between the
fourth and fifth amendments, stated that the involuntary production of
private papers, which may be required by a warrant issued in accord with
the fourth amendment, violates the self incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment.8 The rule attained maturity in Gouled v. United States,9
where a unanimous Court held that a warrant may not be issued to
search for or seize any property of a purely evidentiary nature. This
decision rested on the premise advanced in Boyd that there is an inter-
relation between the fourth and fifth amendments; it also extended the
Boyd prohibition against the seizure of private papers to any property
of a purely evidentiary nature. The rule composited from these two cases
is that the fifth amendment forbids the use of any form of compulsion to
obtain evidence from the accused. 10 A search warrant compelling com-
pliance under pain of law is a form of compulsion," and thus it may not
be used solely for the purpose of forcing an accused to turn over evidence
in his possession to the prosecution in order that it may be introduced
as evidence against him.' 2 However, such property is legitimately the
subject of a search or seizure if the state can assert some other interest in
it,13 and the subsequent decisions of United States v, Lefkowitz 14 and
Harris v. United States15 extended the "mere evidence" rule to searches
incident to a valid arrest. However, no unanimity of opinion has prevailed
among the courts regarding the classification of articles of clothing. They
have been held to constitute mere evidence of criminal activity' 6 or instru-
8. Id. at 633:
We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They
throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures"
condemned in the fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in a criminal case is
condemned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
9. 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921).
10. Comment, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, 54 GEo. L.J. 593,
595-96, 605-06 (1966).
11. Compulsion exists in the search warrant procedure since failure to comply
with the warrant is a crime. 18 U.S.C. § 2231 (a) (1964). Cf. Wood v. United States,
128 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
12. This concept expressed in Boyd and Gouled originated in the common law
case of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030, 1074, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.
1765), where the court held: "It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse
himself, because the necessary means of compelling self accusation, falling upon the
innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust: and it would seem
that a search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle." (Emphasis added.)
(Quotation found only in official report.)
13. Gouled v. United States, supra note 4.
14. 285 U.S. 452, 465-66 (1932).
15. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
16. In United States v. Richmond, 57 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.W.Va. 1944), the seizure
of articles of clothing was held improper because they were innocent in nature and
lawfully in defendant's possession. In La Rue v. State, 149 Tex. Crim. 598, 197 S.W.2d
570 (1946), blood spattered clothing was held to be mere evidence of criminal activity,
and therefore inadmissible.
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mentalities of the crime,17 and ingenious reasoning often accompanies the
particular conclusion. 18
The Supreme Court decisions in Mapp v. Ohio') and Ker v.
California20 have made critical to the law of search and seizure the dis-
tinction between concepts grounded on constitutional provisions and federal
procedural rules. The state judiciary must respect rules of the former
classification while they may freely disregard the latter. Thus imposition
of the federal "mere evidence" rule on a state judicial system21 can only
be justified if it rests on a solid constitutional foundation. In the instant
case the court of appeals failed to address itself to this consideration.
Because the court neglected to articulate the constitutional foundation of
its decision, an extensive examination of the rationales upon which the
rule purports to rest and a review of the treatment accorded it by the
courts is necessary in order to determine the propriety of imposing the
"mere evidence" rule on the state courts as a constitutional requirement.
The "mere evidence" rule is frequently stated in constitutional terms.2
However, judicial application of the rule to factual situations lacks the
consistency one would expect to be accorded a truly constitutional re-
quirement. The discrepancy in the application of the rule is partially the
result of a failure to satisfactorily articulate how the fourth and fifth
amendments immunize evidential objects from search and seizure.23
Basically three explanations are adduced as the constitutional founda-
tions of the "mere evidence" rule.2 4 The Boyd and Gouled decisions are
grounded on the principle that only those items in which the state has a
direct or derivative possessory interest are subject to search and seizure.
The permitted scope of search and seizure is limited to fruits of the
17. In United States v. Guido, 251 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 950(1958), shoes were held to be instrumentalities since they facilitate escape. In Morton
v. United States, 147 F.2d 28 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 875 (1945), blood
stained clothing was allowed to be taken from accused's closet and introduced in
evidence at a murder trial. See State v. Bisaccia, 45 N.J. 505, 213 A.2d 185 (1965),
noted in 34 FORDHAm L. Rgv. 746 (1966) ; Boles v. Commonwealth, 304 Ky. 216, 200
S.W.2d 467 (1947).
18. Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964).
19. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
20. 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
21. Maryland has never adhered to such a concept. Matthews v. State, 228 Md.
401, 179 A.2d 892, 893 (1962): "The officers had authority to search the premise
and . . . seize tangible evidence of the crime." Accord, Davis v. State, 238 Md. 389,
204 A.2d 76 (1964) ; Shorey v. State, 227 Md. 385, 177 A.2d 245 (1962).
22. E.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) ; Harris v. United States,
supra note 3; United States v. Lefkowitz, supra note 4; Takahashi v. United States,
143 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1944); United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1951).
23. People v. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780, 408 P.2d 108 (1965), (dictum), noted
in 32 BROOKLYN L. RZv. 400 (1966). See Comment, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule
and the Reason, supra note 10, at 607-21. See generally Shellow, The Continuing
Vitality of the Gouled Rule: The Search For and Seizure of Evidence, 48 MARQ. L.
Riv. 172 (1964).
24. See Comment, Limitations On Seizure of Evidentiary Objects: A Rule In
Search Of A Reason, 20 U. CH. L. REv. 319 (1953).
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crime, its instrumentalities and contraband.25 The fruits of the crime
belong to the victim, and are therefore seizable as a vindication of his
title. Instrumentalities of a crime are said to be forfeited to the state
under an expansion of the ancient concept of deodand, 26 and no one has a
private possessory right in that which the law determines to be contra-
band.27 Thus there can be no search for or seizure of merely evidential
objects since they do not fall within the permitted categories. Such an
explanation, however, misconstrues the primary purpose of search and
seizure. Objects are not searched for or seized to vindicate a proprietary
right, but rather to aid in proving the guilt of the accused.28 Search and
seizure springs not from a desire to take from the accused that in which
he has no possessory right, but from a longing to protect the personal
rights of others by placing the accused in a position in which crime is
impossible. 29
Judicial construction has further lessened the value of this right-to-
possession rationale as an explanation of the constitutional foundation
of the "mere evidence" rule. Under Gouled the legitimacy of search or
seizure is dependent upon the "primary interest" which the state has in
the particular evidence. This concept of "primary interest" has been
extended, at least in one area, to property technically owned by the
individual. Records which are required by law to be kept are seizable as
evidence of crime, even though legal title may remain in the individual.3 0
They are quasi public in nature, the state being said to have a "primary
interest" in them.31 It has never been determined why the state does not
have such a "primary interest" in everything tending to prove guilt.82
It is difficult to discern a trace of the right-to-possession concept in the
25. The historical foundation of this concept is the sovereign's right to seize those
objects that it is illegal to possess or to which he may assert a claim because they
have been wrongfully obtained or used. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 623:
The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods . . . are totally different
things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the
purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence
against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government
is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.
"So, also, the laws . . . provide for the searches and seizures of articles and things
which it is unlawful for a person to have in his possession for the purpose of its use
or disposition .. " Id. at 624. For numerous cases upholding the government's right
to seize fruits of the crime, instrumentalities and contraband see cases cited in Com-
ment, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule and the Reason, supra note 10.
26. State v. Chinn, 231 Ore. 259, 373 P.2d 392 (1962) ; see 2 POLLOCK & MAIT-
LAND, Tux HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW 473 (2d ed. 1898); see generally Kaplan,
Searches and Seizures: A No-Man's Land In The Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 474,
477-79 (1961).
27. Marderosian v. United States, 337 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1964).
28. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); State v. Bisaccia, supra
note 17, at 187; see Comment, Search And Seizure In The Supreme Court, 28 U. CHI.
L. Rov. 664, 674-78 (1961).
29. People v. Thayer, supra note 23, at 109.
30. United States v. Kempe, 59 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. Iowa 1945). But see Freeman
v. United States, 160 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1947), in which stock record books were held
to be immune from seizure since they did not constitute an instrumentality.
31. Rodgers v. United States, 138 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1943).
32. See 20 MIcH. L. Rev. 93 (1921).
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fourth amendment.83 However, it is maintained that the fifth amendment
requires an interpretation of the fourth which would exclude search and
seizure of mere evidence. 34 It is also held that the "mere evidence" rule
rests squarely on the fifth amendment. 35 This latter proposition is not
logically conclusive. If it is violative of the privilege against self-
incrimination to search for or seize merely evidential items, then there is
compelling reason to immunize also the instrumentalities of the crime.
Their capacity to incriminate may be far more real than that of merely
evidential objects. Yet instrumentalities are held to be properly the
subject of search and seizure.3 6
The notion that the fifth amendment demands an interpretation of
the fourth which would prohibit search and seizure of mere evidence may
have recently been restricted by the Supreme Court in Schmerber v.
California.37 There the Court held that the scope of the privilege against
self-incrimination was confined to compelled "communication or testimony"
and that compulsion inducing an accused to produce real or physical evi-
dence is without the pale of that privilege. 8 This may have restricted the
rule expressed in Boyd39 and Gouled, that the fifth amendment prohibits
the issuance of a search warrant for mere evidence, to those cases which
involve the production of private papers. Such documents may still be
considered as communications and thus protected. However, application
of the "mere evidence" rule to cases which involve tangibles other than
private papers is now more difficult to justify on fifth amendment grounds.
The comprehensive right of privacy secured by the fourth and fifth
amendments forms the final, commonly offered explanation of the constitu-
tional basis of the "mere evidence" rule.40 Boyd states that -the fundamental
right of privacy preserved by these two amendments is of "the very
essence of constitutional liberty."'41 The "mere evidence" rule may provide
additional protection of this right by confining the permitted range of search.
"[L]imitations upon the fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest
33. State v. Bisaccia, supra note 17, at 187.
34. Boyd v. United States, supra note 8.
35. Davis v. United States, supra note 22, at 505 (dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter); Richmond v. United States, supra note 16; Davis, FEDERAL
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES § 1.71 (1964).
36. See notes 4 & 25 supra.
37. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
38. Id. at 764. This is not a novel interpretation of the fifth amendment. Mr.
Justice Holmes stated in Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910) : "[T]he pro-
hibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from
him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material." See also
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50 (1919). See generally Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction Of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 Mic. L. Rim. 1 (1930).
39. 116 U.S. at 633: "And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a
man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially
different from compelling him to be a witness against himself."
40. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 454-57 (1963) (concurring opinion
of Mr. Chief Justice Warren) ; Cf., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
41. Supra note 5, at 630.
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itself .... ,,42 The pervasiveness of this rationale as an explanation of
the "mere evidence" rule has been limited by the Supreme Court itself. The
Court has refused to apply the rule to an area of the law in which privacy
is severely invaded - wiretap cases. In On Lee v. United States43 the
Gouled rule was held to apply only to tangible objects. If it is the function
of this rule to secure personal privacy, the rationality of this limitation on
its potential effectiveness can be questioned.4 4
The foregoing indicates that the rationales offered as explanations for
the constitutional foundations of the "mere evidence" rule belie its
constitutional underpinnings. Nor has judicial interpretation reinforced or
given vitality to the rule. The Supreme Court, after unequivocally
enunciating the rule, has allowed its debilitation by qualification and
exception, and in Zap v. United States,45 may have reduced it to a vir-
tual nullity. In Gouled it was stated that only fruits of the crime, its
instrumentalities, and contraband may be searched for and seized. The
Court's own confusion and indecision as to what constitutes an instru-
mentality has severely emasculated the rule.46 In Marron v. United States47
certain utility bills were held to be properly the subject of seizure on the
ground that they were so "closely related to the business [that] it
[was] not unreasonable to consider -them as used to carry it on." 48  If
that statement is accepted as the criterion of instrumentality very little
could fail to qualify. In United States v. Lefkowitz 40 ledgers and bills were
seized during a search incident to an arrest. The search was held to be
exploratory. However, the Court stated that the bills were unoffending in
themselves, although they were perhaps intended to be used in a criminal
conspiracy.50 In Abel v. United States51 the Court conceded that the two
decisions were irreconcilable and stated that each must be decided on its
own facts.52  Such an acknowledgement may intimate that there is no
overriding consideration dispositive of the issue.5 3
42. United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930). For arguments that
limitations on the permitted scope of search do not limit the quest, see Kaplan, Search
And Seizure: A No-Man's Land In The Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. Rgv. 474, 478
(1961).
43. 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952) ; see Olmstead v.'United States, 277 U.S. 438,
461-63 (1928).
44. People v. Thayer, supra note 23. Regarding the application of the "mere
evidence" rule to wire tap cases see Kamisar, The Wiretapping Eavesdropping
Problem: A Professor's View, 44 MINN. L. Rtv. 891, 914-18 (1960); Comment,
Eavesdropping Orders and the Fourth Amendment, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 355 (1966).
45. 328 U.S. 624 (1945).
46. See Comment, Evidentiary Searches: The Rule And The Reason, supra
note 10, at 605-16.
47. 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
48. Id. at 199.
49. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
50. Id. at 465.
51. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
52. Id. at 235.
53. In Foley v. United States, 64 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1933), the court followed the
reasoning of Marron and admitted into evidence certain ledgers. However, in United
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Unguided by any clear method of distinguishing instrumentalities
from merely evidential matter, the lower courts have reached conflicting
results. Not only is there an inconsistency in the decisions among the
districts,5 4 but conflicting views have even been adopted within the same
district. In United States v. Loft on 6th Floor of Bldg.55 the district court
granted a motion to suppress letters offering obscene material for sale;
they were held to be mere evidence of the crime. In United States v. Klaw56
the same court held that circulars offering pornography for sale were
instrumentalities of the crime. Further, the instrumentalities qualification
has been distended to the point that it is no longer necessary to prove
that the objects were actually used in the commission of the crime. It was
stated by the court in United States v. Pardo Bolland57 that in the interest
of justice the line between instrumentality and mere evidence should not
be drawn too finely. Thus it is necessary only to show that the object
seized is reasonably capable of criminal use.
5 8
Weeks v. United States59 and United States v. Kirschenblatt6 ° contain
an exception to the "mere evidence" rule which has greatly qualified it.
Those two cases hold that evidentiary material found on the person of
the accused incident to his arrest is not immune from seizure. This
exception makes the issue of seizability of material depend not on its
characterization as mere evidence, but rather on something extraneous
to that issue - its presence on the person of the accused. 61 In Zap v.
United States62 the emasculation of the "mere evidence" rule may have
been completed. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, stated
that testimentary or even photographic evidence may be introduced at
the trial concerning objects not subject to seizure.63 If this statement be
States v. Poller, supra note 42, the court held ledgers to be evidentiary and therefore
inadmissible. The same conclusion was reached in Bushouse v. United States, 67 F.2d
843 (6th Cir. 1933).
54. Compare United States v. Lerner, 100 F. Supp. 765 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (an
address book held not to be an instrumentality), with Matthew v. Correa, 135 F.2d 534
(2d Cir. 1943) (an address book held to be an instrumentality).
55. 182 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
56. 227 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 350 F.2d 155 (2d
Cir. 1965).
57. 229 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 316 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 407 (1965).
58. Id. at 476.
59. 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). The government has the right "to search the person
of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of
crime." (Emphasis added.)
60. 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926) : "Whatever the casuistry of border cases, it
is broadly a totally different thing to search a man's pockets and use against him what
they contain, from ransacking his house for everything which may incriminate him,
once you have gained lawful entry, either by means of a search warrant or by
his consent."
61. For criticism of this exception see Comment, Search And Seizure of "Mere
Evidence" - Amendment To Or. Rev. Stat. Sec. 141.010 - Effect On Prior Law and
Constitutionality, 43 ORS. L. Rlv. 333, 342-46 (1964).
62. See supra note 45.
63. Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 629 (1945). In Williams v. United States,
263 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1959), the court held, in contradiction to Zap, that the testi-
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accepted, application of the "mere evidence" rule to a factual situation in
which the items are discovered in the course of a valid search would be of
little consequence.
The foregoing discussion bespeaks a certain uneasiness which many
courts feel toward the "mere evidence" rule, and describes the various
rationales they have employed to restrain its effect. The majority opinion
in Hayden, on the other hand, represents a decided expansion of the rule's
potential scope of application. This decision is an attempt by the federal
judiciary to impose upon the state courts as a constitutional mandate the
concept that mere evidence of criminal activity is immune from search
and seizure. When the impulse of other courts to constrain the appli-
cability of the "mere evidence" rule and the broadening effect which this
decision may have on its sphere of operation are considered, the failure of
the Hayden majority to provide an articulate, reasoned justification for the
use and extension of the rule is surprising. The majority opinion simply
asserts that the clothing was not an instrumentality and was therefore not
subject to search and seizure. An examination of the rule and a critical
analysis of the reasoning which would tend to support a conclusion that
the clothing was properly seizable would have better served the court's
position. Three factors lend themselves to further consideration - the
instrumentality qualification, the underlying rationale of the rule itself
as applied to clothing, and the current philosophy of the Supreme Court.
It was held in United States v. Guido64 that because shoes could
facilitate escape they might be found to be instrumentalities of criminal
activity and therefore subject to seizure. The argument advanced by the
dissent in Hayden resembles that offered in Guido. The petitioner by his
removel and concealment of the items of clothing has himself put them
at issue and demonstrated their essential link to the crime. But the
majority refused to consider such a rationale as a possible alternative to
its holding the clothing to be mere evidence. Instead it stated that Guido
could not be reconciled with the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
When the position of the Court concerning the essential character of an
instrumentality - that there is no absolute determinant 65 - is recalled,
this unexplained disqualification of the clothing is curious. The majority
also failed to consider and distinguish the growing body of case law which
asserts that actual use, or even actual intention to use, is not essential
to the classification of an item as an instrumentality.6 6
In its limited consideration of the constitutional basis of the "mere
evidence" rule the majority stated that on the basis of the fourth amend-
mentary evidence of an officer concerning objects seen in the course of a search was
inadmissible. This evidence was excluded, however, primarily because the search
itself was unreasonable, there having been no warrant or consent.
64. See supra note 17.
65. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
66. United States v. Pardo Bolland, supra note 57; United States v. Lord, 184 F.
Supp. 923 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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ment no distinction can be drawn between papers and articles of clothing. 7
Indeed, the court intimated that a search for mere evidence is per se
unreasonable. However, the court had found the search in the instant
case to have been reasonable. It has thus placed itself in the difficult
position of holding that a search previously found to be reasonable may
at the same time be unreasonable if merely evidential objects are seized.
In order to obviate such an inconsistency Chief Justice Weintraub of New
Jersey has argued in State v. Bisaccia,6" another case involving the seizure
of shoes, that for purposes of application of the "mere evidence" rule papers
should be distinguished from other tangibles. The fourth amendment was
adopted primarily as a safeguard against the noxious writs of assistance
which authorized general and exploratory searches. 69 It is Judge Wein-
traub's thesis that the "mere evidence" rule may be invoked as an addi-
tional protection of privacy in searches of private papers. Such searches
entail the rummaging through books and files, the exposing of confidences,
thus becoming, in effect, an exploratory search.7 0 However, in searches
for other tangibles when specificity is possible the rule protects no vital
interest.7 1 The Weeks and Kirschenblatt exception,7 2 that mere evidence
found on the person of the defendant is subject to seizure, supports Justice
Weintraub's conclusion. This is, of course, premised on the notion that
there will be no general search of the person.73 Thus if articles of clothing
in which a defendant is attired at the time of his arrest are seizable 74 for
purposes of identification 75 and scientific examination, 76 it is difficult to
determine how the clothing becomes immunized by the simple act of
disrobement when the search is otherwise reasonable. As Mr. Justice
Cardozo stated: "The line between fruit of the crime itself and mere
evidence thereof may be narrow; perhaps this turns more on the good
faith of the search than the actual distinction between the matters turned
up."77
67. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68. Supra note 17, at 192.
69. Sanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481, 485 (1965) ; Reynard, Freedom From
Unreasonable Search and Seizure - A Second Class Constitutional Right?, supra
note 6, at 275.
70. United States v. Kirschenblatt, supra note 60, at 204.
71. State v. Bisaccia, supra note 17, at 192.
72. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
73. United States v. Kirschenblatt, supra note 60, at 203.
74. Robinson v. United States, 283 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
919 (1960).
75. King v. Pinto, 256 F. Supp. 522 (D.N.J. 1966).
76. United States v. Margeson, 246 F. Supp. 219 (S.D. Me. 1966) ; accord, State
v. Wragg, 395 S.W.2d 196 (Mo. 1965) ; People v. Shaw, 237 Cal. App. 2d 606, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 96, cert. denied, 384 U.S. 964 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
77. Matthews v. Correa, supra note 54, at 537.
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It is to the rationale78 of Boyd and Gouled that the Hayden majority
must ultimately look for the justification of its failure to distinguish
papers and other tangibles. However the Boyd-Gouled rationale may have
been limited by Schmerber to cases involving the production of personal
papers. Therefore, it may be undesirable to permit unrestrained applica-
tion of the "mere evidence" rule when the theory upon which it is
premised has been circumscribed. Finally, the recent Supreme Court
decisions, Escobedo v. Illinois7 9 and Miranda v. Arizona,80 have put forth
stringent requirements for the admission of confessions. As a result a
premium is placed upon evidence based on scientific investigation. Thus
law enforcement authorities are urged to make impressions of footprints
discovered at the scene of the crime or to analyze the dried blood found
on the accused's clothing.81 Such exhortations may be of little avail
unless an adequate opportunity is afforded the police to obtain such items.
It is urged that a decisive reevaluation of the "mere evidence" rule be
undertaken by the Court before other states'8 2 individual rules regarding
the admissability of evidence of criminal guilt are tailored to fit the federal
standard. 3 Just as it was recognized in Kerr, some concepts, heretofore
stated in constitutional terms, must be reinterpreted in light of the "demands
of our federal system. '8 4 It is submitted that the "mere evidence rule is an
apt candidate for such review. If it is determined that the rule is in fact
grounded in the constitution, further definition of its scope and delineation
of the line separating mere evidence from instrumentality will be necessary.
Daniel T. Murphy
78. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
79. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
80. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
81. Schmerber v. California, supra note 37, by holding that the extraction of a
blood sample from the accused is not violative of the privilege against self-incrimination,
serves to illustrate this point.
82. California, in People v. Thayer, supra note 23, and New Jersey, in State v.
Bisaccia, supra note 17, have rejected the notion that the "mere evidence" rule is a
constitutional mandate. Contra, State v. Naturile, 83 N.J. Super. 563, 200 A.2d 617(1964). Other state courts have also refused to apply the "mere evidence" rule in state
proceedings: State v. Raymond, 142 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1966) ; State v. Coolidge,
208 A.2d 322 (N.H. 1965); People v. Carroll, 38 Misc. 2d 630, 238 N.Y.S.2d 640
(Sup. Ct. 1963) ; People v. Martin, 49 Misc. 2d 268, 267 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup. Ct. 1966) ;
Eisentrager v. State, 79 Nev. 38, 378 P.2d 526 (1963). Other jurisdictions have ignored
the issue and have admitted mere evidence of criminal activity: Bryant v. State, 106
Ga. 642, 127 S.E.2d 826 (1962) ; State v. Wade, 190 Kan. 624, 376 P.2d 915 (1962) ;
People v. Kaigler, 368 Mich. 281, 118 N.W.2d 406 (1962) ; State v. Goff, 174 Neb.
548, 118 N.W.2d 625 (1962) ; State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 179 A.2d 466 (1962).
83. FoD. R. CRIM. P. 41(b) provides that warrants may be issued to search for
and seize only such property as is:
1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the Laws of the United States; or
2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the means
of committing a criminal offense; or
3) Possessed, controlled or designed or intended for use or which is or has
been used in violation of Section 957 of revised Title 18 U.S.C. § 957.
84. Ker v. California, supra note 20, at 33.
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CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCING - PROSECUTION HAS THE BURDEN
OF JUSTIFYING IMPOSITION OF A LONGER SENTENCE THAN THAT
GIVEN AT PRIOR TRIAL FOR SAME OFFENSE.
Patton v. North Carolina (W.D.N.C. 1966)
In 1960 petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, was tried and
convicted for armed robbery and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.
After serving five years, he sought and was granted a new trial pursuant to
the Supreme Court ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright,' but was again con-
victed. Upon his second conviction petitioner received a twenty-five year
sentence which the trial court reduced to twenty years by crediting petitioner
with the time he had served under the original sentence. Because the longer
sentence also extended the time before he would be eligible for parole, peti-
tioner sought a writ of habeas corpus2 in the United States District Court for
the Western District of North Carolina, contending that he had been uncon-
stitutionally penalized for securing a new trial. The court held that a defen-
dant's constitutional right to credit for time served under a previous sentence
may be effectively avoided by the imposition of an increased sentence at a
second trial only when a discernable reason exists for the harsher punish-
ment. In the absence of such a reason, the imposition of harsher punishment
at a second trial is so fundamentally unfair as to violate the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment.3 Patton v. North
Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
The practice of denying a defendant credit for time served under a
prior conviction has been justified by the use of two theories customarily
referred to as the "void" and "waiver" doctrines. 4 Both of these doctrines
were originally employed to prevent a defendant, who had been erroneously
convicted, from asserting the defense of double jeopardy as a. bar to re-
prosecution after he had secured a reversal of his original conviction. 5
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. The habeas corpus review sought by petitioner in the instant case must be
distinguished from cases which arise on appeal in those jurisdictions which provide
appellate courts with the power to review and modify legal but excessive sentences.
See generally Mueller, Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive
Sentences, 15 VAND. L. Riv. 671 (1962).3. The Patton court took jurisdiction in this case despite the fact that North
Carolina provided a post-conviction procedure to review punishments. North Carolina
case law, however, rendered recourse to its court useless. Hence, jurisdiction could
be maintained under the exception that the available state process was ineffective to
protect the petitioner's rights. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1964). As to Patton, the court found
no evidence which rationally tended to support the imposition of an increased sentence
and ordered that he be constitutionally resentenced within ninety days. Patton v.
North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 236 (W.D.N.C. 1966).
4. There are jurisdictions which have maintained that sentence procedures are
an exclusive legislative concern and thus dispose of claims for credit time on that
basis. See People v. Judd, 396 Ill. 211, 71 N.E.2d 29 (1947) ; In re Doelle, 323 Mich.
241, 35 N.W.2d 251 (1948). For a list of statutes which provide for the right to credit,
see Whalen, Resentence Without Credit For Time Served: Unequal Protection Of
The Laws, 35 MINN. L. Rev. 239 (1951).
5. At common law in England, once an error had been discovered in the criminal
proceeding under which an individual had been convicted, the government was pre-
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Courts utilizing the "waiver" doctrine held that the defense of double
jeopardy would not be sustained in such cases since the defendant waived
that guarantee when he appealed his conviction and secured a reversal.6
Under the "void" doctrine it was held that a reversal of the original convic-
tion operated as a nullification of that conviction and thereby eliminated it
as the basis for a double jeopardy plea by the defendant in the subsequent
prosecution.7
While the use of these doctrines provided a rationale for the reprosecu-
tion of a defendant whose conviction had been reversed, the scope of their
application was not so limited. In Ogle v. State,s decided by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, the defendant argued that a denial of credit for
time served under an original conviction would amount to a violation of
his constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.9 The court in Ogle
answered defendant's argument by reasoning that since the prior conviction
of defendant was void the sentence resulting therefrom was void as well.
Thus any time served under that sentence was also void and could not be
credited against a subsequent sentence. This analysis was adopted by
numerous courts and persists today in a majority of jurisdictions.' 0
The "waiver" doctrine was similarly applied by the Indiana Supreme
Court in McDowell v. State" where defendant, whose conviction had been
reversed, asserted that he should not have been prosecuted a second time,
or in the alternative, that he should not have been denied three years credit
for the time served under the original conviction. The defendant claimed
that either of these actions placed him in jeopardy a second time thus
violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. The court in
McDowell answered both these contentions by reasoning that defendant
waived his double jeopardy guarantee, when at his instance, the original
conviction was reversed. As a result, defendant could not utilize the double
jeopardy guarantee to avoid serving the three years a second time. 2
In addition to the potential loss of credit for time already served, an
erroneously convicted defendant is forced to consider the risk that a second
conviction would expose him to the possibility of receiving a harsher sen-
cluded from reprosecuting. This situation influenced American courts into nullifying
the entire proceeding for fear that a criminal would ultimately escape punishment by
securing a reversal of his original conviction. Thus the courts failed to realize that
the criminal proceeding could have been, and in fact was, split up for given purposes.
See Whalen, supra note 4, at 243. See generally Comley, Former Jeopardy, 35 YALU
L.J. 674 (1926).
6. See Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905). But see Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
7. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ; United States v. Harman, 68
Fed. 472 (D. Kan. 1895).
8. 43 Tex. Crim. 219, 63 S.W. 219 (1901).
9. Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873), stated expressly that doublejeopardy applied to punishment as well as to prosecution.
10. See, e.g., Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 So. 369 (1913) ; Commonwealth
v. Murphy, 174 Mass. 369, 54 N.E. 860 (1899), aff'd, 177 U.S. 155 (1901) ; Morgan
v. Cox, 75 N.M. 472, 406 P.2d 347 (1965).
11. 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947).
12. Accord, State v. Terreso, 56 Kan. 126, 42 Pac. 354 (1895) ; Hobbs v. State,
231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 914 (1963) ; Ex parte Wilkerson,
76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943).
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tence than he had received at the original trial. The United States Supreme
Court encouraged the practice of imposing harsher sentences at a second
trial when it applied the "waiver" doctrine in Stroud v. United States.13
There the defendant, convicted of a murder for the second time, received
the death penalty at his second trial, after he had obtained a reversal of
his original conviction and sentence of life imprisonment. The Supreme
Court rejected the defendant's double jeopardy argument by reasoning that
in securing a reversal of the first conviction he had waived it as the basis
for a double jeopardy objection.14 Presently, the imposition of harsher
sentences upon successful criminal appellants is permitted throughout the
federal courts and also in a substantial majority of the state courts.15
For forty years after the Court laid to rest these double jeopardy
objections, neither the practice of denying credit for time served nor that
of increasing sentences of a second trial was seriously threatened. The
present challenge to the constitutionality of both practices was foreshadowed
by the case of Green v. United States.'6 There the Supreme Court struck
down a first degree murder conviction after the reversal of a conviction
of second degree murder. The Court reasoned that the conviction for
second degree murder impliedly acquitted the defendant of first degree
murder, and therefore a second prosecution for first degree murder consti-
tuted double jeopardy. 17 However, Green's relevance to the issue in the
instant case centers around the Court's statement that the risk of a second
prosecution for first degree murder, including a death sentence, unreason-
ably conditions a prisoner's right to appeal for the correction of errors
in his conviction.' 8
In People v. Henderson19 the California Supreme Court focused on
the concern for the defendant's right to appeal as evidenced in the Green
case and applied similar reasoning to the issue of harsher sentencing at a
second trial. The court struck down a death penalty imposed on the peti-
tioner after he had obtained a reversal of his original conviction and life
sentence for murder. Overruling its own cases which had reviewed harsher
sentencing at retrial the court said:
[DIefendant's right to appeal from an erroneous judgment is
unreasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke
that right. Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous
judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by . . .
imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to appeal.20
13. 251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920). But see People
v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963), where the
California Supreme Court read Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957), as
vitiating the ruling in the Stroud case.
14. Stroud v. United States, supra note 13, at 18; People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.
2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
15. Van Alstyne, In Gideon's Wake: Harsher Penalties And The "Successful"
Criminal Appellant, 74 YALz L.J. 607, 610 (1965).
16. 355U.S. 184 (1957).
17. Id. at 193.
18. Id. at 194.
19. 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
20. Id. at 497, 386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 92. (Emphasis added.)
[VOL. 12
47
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In United States v. Boyce,2 1 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, also facing the issue of harsher sentences in relation to the protec-
tion of a prisoner's right to appeal, stated in unequivocal terms that the
use of increased sentences to inhibit the right to appeal could not be sus-
tained. However, the Court found no facts to support the petitioner's
contention that he had received an increase for that reason.22 The Boyce
case may be viewed as indicative of the traditional position taken by the
courts toward the interplay of harsher sentencing at a second trial and
the protection of a petitioner's right to correct errors in his conviction.238
It is therefore more expansive than Henderson, at least in the sense that
any increased sentence at a second trial may be considered as an attempt
by the trial court to frustrate prisoners in their efforts to appeal erroneous
convictions. However, application of the Boyce decision is limited by the
fact that in an individual case the petitioner is presented with an almost
insurmountable burden of proving that the trial judge's motive in giving
an increased sentence was the desire to discourage appeals.2 4
In the instant case Judge Craven rejected the "void" and "waiver"
doctrines in favor of a more realistic approach to the credit and harsher
sentence issues.25 Agreeing with Mr. Justice Bobbit who stated in State
v. Weaver26 that "the hard fact of his actual service of sentence ... cannot
be ignored," Judge Craven disputed the notion that the application of
these doctrines could justify erasing the years a man had served in prison.27
A denial of credit for that time against the sentence imposed at a second
trial was "so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a violation of the Due
Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment .... ,,128
His rejection of the "void" and "waiver" doctrines is supported by a
number of cases and commentators who have maligned 29 and ridiculed30
21. 352 F.2d 786 (4th Cir. 1965).
22. Id. at 788.
23. Actually the case seems to reiterate the presumption that the trial judge was
properly motivated in increasing the length of the original sentence, even when the
increase immediately followed the defendant's declaration of his intent to appeal. See
Nichols v. United States, 106 F. 672 (8th Cir. 1901).
24. In relation to the difficulty, Judge Craven stated:
To put upon the prisoner the burden of proving improper trial judge motivation
is like granting him the opportunity to move Parnassus with a spoon. Not even
another trial judge has the omniscience to divine his brother's motivation.
Patton v. North Carolina, 256 F. Supp. 225, 235 (W.D.N.C. 1966). It is interesting
to note that the defendant in the Boyce case accused Judge Craven of imposing harsher
sentences for the purpose of frustrating the right to appeal. Patton v. North Carolina,
suora at 236 n.14.
25. After discussing the doctrines as they were applied in North Carolina, Judge
Craven said: "Four years and four months of a man's liberty ought not to be wiped
out by legal fiction." Id. at 233.
26. 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965).
27. Patton v. North Carolina, supra note 24, at 233.
28. Id. at 236.
29. See King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 (D.C. Cir. 1938), where it is suggested
ad absurdum that under the void sentence theory when a prisoner obtains a reversal
he should be held in quasi contract for the services he received in prison.
30. See Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sentence or Conviction - A
Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MONT. L. Rzv. 3 (1963).
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the unwarranted application of those doctrines to the credit and harsher
sentence issues.
If Patton did no more than place the question of credit for time served
within the purview of the fourteenth amendment it would be highly signifi-
cant. However, a technicality of North Carolina case laws1 revealed that
the fourteenth amendment could not provide sufficient protection of the
defendant's right to credit for time served. Since, historically, courts in all
jurisdictions had treated the issues of credit for time served and harsher
sentencing at a second trial as separate issues, 32 it had been possible to
pay lip service to the injustice of denying the defendant credit and yet
avoid the effect of crediting that time by imposing a longer sentence at
the second trial. This is precisely what occurred at Patton's second trial,
where the trial judge, following State v. Weaver,33 did allow credit for the
five years Patton had already served but only against the maximum sen-
tence which could have been imposed for Patton's offense (twenty-five
years). In effect, Patton, through the imposition of a longer sentence, had
been first granted and then denied credit for the time he had served.
Since this practice of increasing sentences at a second trial was so
widely accepted, a limitation on that practice was necessary in order to
avoid an easy circumvention of the right to credit for time served. In the
instant case the limitation provided by the court was a rebuttable presump-
tion that the proper punishment had been imposed at the original trial. 34
Judge Craven reasoned that if a harsher sentence was to be imposed at
defendant's second trial the record must show facts which tend to rationally
support the imposition of such a penalty, or the second sentence will fall.35
The position taken by the court in Patton is clearly a solution to the diffi-
culty of proof which the Boyce case left unanswered.3 6 Henceforth, the
state will carry the burden of justifying the increased sentence and the
31. In State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964), the North Carolina
Supreme Court had expressly rejected the notion that credit for time served was
compelled. State v. Weaver, 264 N.C. 681, 142 S.E.2d 633 (1965), modified the
Williams case to the extent that service under both sentences could not exceed the
maximum penalty for the particular offense. Additionally, the Weaver case noted that
credit should be given to prevent glaring and intolerable injustice. On the other hand,
State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), held that increased sentences at a
second trial were permissible.
32. See Van Alstyne, supra note 15.
33. See cases cited at note 31 supra.
34. The presumption that the original sentence was a proper punishment for the
particular offense first appears in Meaders v. State, 96 Ga. 299, 22 S.E. 527 (1895).
It was subsequently adopted in State v. Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142 (1942),
which Judge Craven cited.
35. The decision leaves open an interesting question as to what kind of facts will
support the imposition of an increased sentence. If facts which were ignored by the
prosecution at the first trial are proper as support, the state would in effect have an
opportunity to correct tactical errors or omissions made at the first trial. Therefore,
only facts arising since the original trial, for instance, prison conduct and attitude,
should be permitted as support for the increased sentence.
36. See note 24 supra.
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defendant's right to credit for time served will be preserved to the extent
that such credit is warranted in his case. 37
In addition to his determination that harsher penalties at a second trial
may be fundamentally unfair, Judge Craven also indicated that another
basis for his decision was the danger that such sentences presented to the
petitioner's exercise of rights to have errors in his conviction corrected.38
The court focused on two facts as the basis for its concern with the protec-
tion of a prisoner's right to petition for habeas corpus. The first was a
survey conducted by Duke University, which demonstrated that credit for
time served had been effectively denied in seventy-two percent of the cases
which had been retried before the Superior Court of North Carolina.39
The second was a letter in which a prisoner, whose conviction had been
reversed, implored Judge Craven to prevent the state from bringing him
to trial again for fear that a harsher sentence would be imposed.4 0 From
this evidence Judge Craven presumed correctly that, whether justified or
not, prisoners in North Carolina would believe, especially from Patton's
case, that their predecessors had been punished for exercising their right
to obtain a new trial. In the light of these considerations, Judge Craven
concluded "that the imposition of a harsher penalty . . . inhibits the right
to petition for a new trial and unconstitutionally conditions that right."41
It is clear that by employing the "void" and "waiver" doctrines the
courts have placed wrongfully convicted prisoners in a dilemma.42 The
possibility of receiving a harsher sentence upon reconviction will certainly
inhibit petitions for a new trial and as a consequence the state will be
able to prosecute an individual without being held to the requirements
and limitations of the constitution. If the prisoner fears reconviction because
of potentially harsher sentencing, it may be presumed that he does so in
the belief that the second prosecution will succeed notwithstanding an
adherence to the originally ignored guarantees. If in fact, the state can
not reconvict the prisoner without ignoring his constitutional rights, the
prisoner's fear of an adverse result should not be utilized to sustain the
original conviction. As was noted in the Henderson decision, "since the
state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest
in foreclosing appeals therefrom. . . -43 Therefore, while the instant case
is correct in striking down as unconstitutional the practice of imposing
37. Judge Craven's ruling that harsher sentences may be imposed if the record
supports them is probably a compromise offer to those who contend that increased
sentences are needed to restrain the rapidly increasing number of appeals. See generally
Note, 1965 DUKS L.J. 395.
38. Patton v. North Carolina, supra note 24, at 236.
39. Id. at 231 & n.6. See Note, 1965 DuIm L.J. 395.
40. Patton v. North Carolina, supra note 24, at 235 n.7.
41. Id. at 236.
42. The reasoning in People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 77 (1963), was subsequently extended to apply to all sentences and to habeas
corpus petitions. See In Application of Ferguson, 233 Cal.2d 79, 43 Cal. Rptr. 325
(1965), which was adopted in State v. Wolf, 46 N.J. 301, 216 A.2d 586 (1966).
43. People v. Henderson, supra note 14, at 497, 386 P.2d at 686, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 92.
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harsher punishment at a second trial without supporting evidence, it is
submitted that a defendant's exercise of the right to seek the correction of
errors in his original conviction can be effectively secured only by the
imposition of an absolute restriction on the practice of increasing the
original sentence. 4 Under no circumstances should an individual be com-
pelled to expose himself to the danger of receiving a harsher sentence as
the price of exercising the right to appeal from an improper conviction.
Edward J. David
FEDERAL COURTS - REVIEW OF TRANSFER ORDERS- DISTRICT
COURT'S EVALUATION OF PROPER FACTORS IN GRANTING OR DENYING
TRANSFER OF VENUE IS REVIEWABLE BY MANDAMUS PROCEEDING;
AN INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL IS UNAVAILABLE.
A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros. (2d Cir. 1966)
Petitioner, a New York corporation, initiated a breach of warranty
action against respondent, a Tennessee corporation, in a New York state
court. Respondent obtained removal of the action to the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of New York and then moved, under the
provisions of section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code,' that the case be trans-
ferred to the Eastern District of Tennessee. The district court, emphasiz-
ing that the respondent expected to call more witnesses and that the case
would proceed to trial far more quickly in Tennessee, ordered the case
transferred. The New York district court, pursuant to section 1292(b) of
the Judicial Code,2 then certified that it considered the order appropriate
for interlocutory appeal. Petitioner, conceding that the district court had
44. Cf., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Hetenyi v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844
(2d Cir. 1965).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964): "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964):
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion
and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court
of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such
order, if application is made to it within ten days after the entry of the order:
Provided, however, That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay pro-
ceedings in the district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or
a judge thereof shall so order.
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considered the proper factors in deciding the transfer motion but arguing
that these factors had been erroneously evaluated, sought review by leave
to appeal pursuant to section 1292(b) or, in the alternative, for a writ of
mandamus as provided in section 1651 (a) of the Judicial Code,3 ordering
the New York district court to vacate its transfer order. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to allow the ap-
peal, holding: (1) section 1292(b) does not allow an interlocutory appeal
to secure review of the grant or denial of section 1404(a) transfer mo-
tions for alleged incorrect evaluation of proper factors by the district
court; and (2) while the courts of appeals are possessed of the power to
issue writs of mandamus to correct the disposition of a transfer motion
by the district court, the instant case did not require the exercise of this
power. A. Olnick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439 (2d Cir. 1966).
The touchstone of appealability in the federal courts4 is the final judg-
ment rule as presently embodied in section 1291 of the Judicial Code. 5
However, the existence of recurring situations where appellate review
postponed until a final judgment had been rendered would result in
irreparable injury6 has impelled legislative and judicial exceptions to the
final judgment rule. Judicially, the landmark cases of Forgay v. Conradr
and Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,8 wherein certain "non-
final" orders received appellate review, manifest an exception to the final
judgment rule. Legislatively, sections 12929 and 165110 of the Judicial
Code provide avenues for avoidance of the rule by allowing interlocutory
appeals in certain circumstances.
Analytically, a discussion of the availability of appellate review of
transfer orders before final judgment should focus on and resolve the
following: (1) The desirability of immediate appellate review of these
orders; and (2) the appropriate method - by appeal or otherwise - of
immediate review. In the instant case the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit impliedly conceded the desirability of immediate review
of transfer orders by focusing its attention on whether an interlocutory
appeal or mandamus is the appropriate method of review.
Section 1404(a)" indicates that transfer of venue will be appropri-
ate if, and only if, two tests are met: (1) the transfer must be "for the
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964) : "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary to appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law."
4. See generally Note, Appealability In the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. Rgv.
351 (1961).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1958) : "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ...except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
6. E.g., 4 MOORE, FEDERAL PRActicE 1 54.04 (2d ed. 1965) ; Note, Appealability
In the Federal Courts, 75 HARV. L. Rlv. 351, 352 (1961) ; Note, Section 1292(b):
Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, 54 Gxo. L.J. 940, 941 (1966).
7. 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201 (1848).
8. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1964).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1964).
11. See note 1 sltpra.
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convenience of parties and witnesses" and "in the interest of justice";
and (2) the transfer must be to a district or division where the action
"might have been brought.' u2 Both tests necessitate consideration by the
district court of certain factors before ruling on a transfer motion;
application of the former test being less subject to objective measurement
than the latter. Though a 1404(a) order granting or denying transfer is
not considered final,'" immediate appellate review of the order, either
by mandamus 14 or pursuant to section 1292(b),I'8 can generally be ob-
tained where it is alleged that the district court erred with respect to the
latter (jurisdictional) test. The first test, however, has been widely recog-
nized to vest considerable discretion in the district court, although certain
factors have been enumerated which are to be considered in deciding
upon the propriety of a transfer order.18 The ensuing discussion of the
desirability and mode of appellate review of transfer orders will be con-
fined to those orders not involving jurisdictional questions where the
district court has come to a conclusion granting or denying the transfer
after evaluating the ordained factors.
The desirability of immediate appellate review of transfer orders
can best be shown by considering the inadequacy of appellate review of
these orders at the conclusion of the action. One commentator has
concluded:
Review of 1404(a) orders at the conclusion of an action does not
adequately protect litigants. If a party can afford the increased ex-
pense caused by an erroneous transfer order, ultimate appeal offers
him no opportunity to recoup. If such expense makes prosecution
or defense of an action economically unfeasible, the resulting default
or dismissal bars a hearing on the merits. Moreover, a party whose
case has been prejudiced by his inability to require the personal
appearance of a witness because of a 1404(a) order generally cannot
show harmful error. 17
12. In Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the United States Supreme Court
construed this phrase to mean that the transferee district must be one in which the
plaintiff would have had a right to sue, independently of the wishes of the defendant,
at the time the action was originally commenced. This phrase was further explained
in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). See also Kitch, Section 1404(a) Of
the Judicial Code: In The Interest Of Justice Or Injusticef, 40 IND. L.J. 99, 100(1965). See generally 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 0.145 [6.-I] (2d ed. 1965).
13. See I BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.7 n.89
(Wright ed. 1960).
14. Id. § 86.7 n.89.5.
15. Id. § 86.7 n.89.3. That § 1292(b) was designed to cover a § 1404(a) order
when the jurisdictional aspect is in question is evidenced by the testimony of Judge
Parker at hearings held before subcommittee No. 3 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary (85th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 11 at 18 (1958)), when he pointed out that
when an order transferring the place of trial is challenged on the ground that the
transferee court lacks venue, an immediate appeal might be appropriate. See also
Note, Section 1292(b): Eight Years Of Undefined Discretion, 54 Gto. L.J. 940,
943 (1966).
16. See 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 0.145[5] (2d ed. 1964) for an exhaustive
list of these factors. See also Kitch, supra note 12, at 131-37. The district court's
failure to consider a proper factor or consideration of an improper factor will generally
give rise to immediate appellate review in a mandamus proceeding. See 1 BARRON &
HOLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 86.7 n.89.5 (Wright ed. 1960).
17. Note, Appealability Of 1404(a) Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALE
L.J. 122, 124 & nn.9-11 (1957). (Footnotes omitted.)
[VOL. 12
53
Editors: Recent Developments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The possible existence of these hardships militates strongly for the adop-
tion of some immediate means of reviewing a transfer order where the
district court considered the proper factors but allegedly arrived at an
erroneous order. To deny a means of immediate review in these circum-
stances would be to elevate the district court's discretion to a virtually
invulnerable position.18
The court in the instant decision dealt with two possible modes of
reviewing a transfer order when the district court's evaluation of proper
factors is questioned: (1) interlocutory appeal pursuant to section
1292(b) ; and (2) a mandamus proceeding pursuant to section 1651(a).
In dismissing the applicability of section 1292(b), the Second Circuit
established a standard for future litigants desiring interlocutory review
of the district court's evaluation of proper factors in granting or denying
a transfer order. This standard is that any interlocutory review of that
evaluation will be exclusively by petition for a writ of mandamus. By so
doing, the Second Circuit aligned itself with the Third and Sixth Circuits
in denying the use of section 1292(b) to rectify an incorrect evaluation
of proper factors by the district court in deciding a transfer of venue
motion.' 9 The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, has permitted the use of
section 1292(b) for this purpose.20
Before an order can qualify under section 1292(b) 21 it must be one
which in the opinion of the district court: (a) involves a controlling ques-
tion of law; (b) offers substantial ground for difference of opinion as to
its correctness; and (c) will materially advance the ultimate termination
of the litigation if immediately appealed. Upon concluding that the order
under consideration qualifies, the district court certifies to the circuit court
that the order fulfills the statutory criteria. The circuit court upon re-
ceiving this certification may in its discretion grant or deny leave to appeal.
With regard to transfer orders for which review is sought solely on the
district court's evaluation of proper factors, the Second, Third and Sixth
Circuits have held that the order is one which could not be properly certi-
fied because of a failure to meet one or all of the above statutory criteria.
The exercise of discretion permitted by the statute was therefore unneces-
sary. The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, in permitting the use of sec-
tion 1292(b) in these circumstances, has accepted the district court's cer-
tification without question. Once the order is certified, the court exercises
18. See 1 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTIC § 0.147, at 1971 (2d ed. 1964). But see
Kitch, supra note 12, at 141-43, where the commentator concludes "[A]pellate inter-
vention in the transfer process in turn entails such a substantial burden of delay that
it outweighs the advantages of [section 1404(a)]."
19. Standard v. Stoll Packing Corp., 315 F.2d 626 (3d Cir. 1963) ; Bufalino v.
Kennedy, 273 F.2d 71 (6th Cir. 1959).
20. Koehring Co. v. Hyde Constr. Co., 324 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1963), 348 F2d
643 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 362 (1966) ; Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v.
Bell Marine Serv., Inc., 321 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1963).
21. See note 2 supra.
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its discretion and usually reviews the order. Logically, one would assume
that in accepting the district court's certification and granting leave to
appeal under section 1292(b), the circuit court has impliedly held that
the order under consideration has fulfilled the statutory prerequisites and
was proper for certification. However, from all indications, the Fifth Cir-
cuit now permits appeal under the section without first determining that
the district court's certification was proper. This leaves open the possi-
bility that should the Fifth Circuit be confronted in an adversary proceed-
ing with the propriety of the district court's certification of a transfer
order based on the district court's evaluation of proper factors, it will
reach a holding similar to that of the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits.
In this respect, the alleged split among the circuits may be illusory.
22 If
the Fifth Circuit rules in conformity with the Second, Third and Sixth
with regard to discretionary transfer orders, it is conceivable that another
conflict with regard to discretionary discovery orders and the applicability
of section 1292(b) will also be resolved. 23 If and when the Fifth Circuit
does review the certification of the district court of an order granting or
denying transfer based solely on the district court's evaluation of proper
factors, the precedent of the Second, Third and Sixth Circuits, as well as
the opinion of Judge Wright in Deepwater Exploration Co. v. Andrew
Weir Ins. Co. 24 interpreting the Congressional intent behind section
1292(b), should compel a result in accord with the majority. 25
The other mode of review discussed and approved in the instant case
for interlocutory review of the district court's evaluation of proper fac-
tors in granting or denying a transfer order is a mandamus proceeding.
Generally, the circuit courts consider themselves possessed of the power 20
to issue the writ but are careful to restrict the exercise of this power to
those cases where there was a "clear abuse of discretion" 27 or in "really
extraordinary situations.1
2
The question of the power of a circuit court to review the district
court's evaluation of proper factors in granting or denying a transfer
order is by no means in a state of unanimity among the various circuits
22. This conclusion is supported by Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Bell Marine Serv.,
Inc., 321 F.2d 53, 55 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1963). In Deepwater Exploration Co. v. Andrew
Weir Ins. Co., 167 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. La. 1958), the district court refused to certify a
transfer order based on an evaluation of proper factors stating that the order did not
fulfill the statutory criteria because it was not within the legislative intent for the
statute to encompass this type of order. In spite of this opinion, the Fifth Circuit has
continued to use § 1292(b) for this type of discretionary order without resolving the
correctness of the Deepwater opinion.
23. See Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. City of Fort Pierce, 323 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.
1963) ; contra, Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. A. B. Chance Co., 313 F.2d 431 (2d Cir. 1963).
24. 167 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. La. 1958).
25. See also Note, Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders:
A Guided Tour Through Section 1292(b) Of The Judicial Code, 69 YAL4 L.J. 333,
350-51 (1959) ; See generally Note, Section 1292(b): Eight Years Of Undefined
Discretion, 54 Gno. L.J. 940 (1966).
26. See A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 443 (2d Cir. 1966).
27. Goranson v. Kloeb, 308 F.2d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1962).
28. In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 183 (lst Cir. 1954).
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or for that matter within the circuits.2 9 In his concurring opinion in the
instant case, Judge Friendly stated:
[O]ur power to issue mandamus is limited to those cases ...where
a district judge has denied a transfer motion without even consider-
ing the merits or has granted or denied one in such flagrant defiance
of accepted principles as to evidence impermissible motivation. 30
He further said: "I therefore concur in denying the writ, but on the basis
that the petition seeks relief beyond our power to grant."al A position
such as that advocated by Judge Friendly would foreclose any chance
of reviewing a district court's evaluation of proper factors, even where
that evaluation was "clearly erroneous." Such an inflexible position is
undesirable.3
2
Practically, the use of the writ seems to offer an expedient mode of
review for a transfer of venue order when the district court's evaluation
of proper factors is in question. The circuit court could consider the
factors which were considered by the district court and, if no abuse of
discretion is found, summarily deny the writ. If, on the other hand, "clear
abuse" of discretion is found, an opinion should be rendered setting forth
the reasons for reversing the district court. The cases indicate that
appellate courts are constrained not to overrule the district court's discre-
tion33 so this procedure would seem to promote efficiency, and to under-
mine possible dilatory tactics when the petition is clearly without merit.34
The modes of review suggested by the courts, Congress and the com-
mentators have as their objective a desire to avoid the final judgment rule
when a "hardship" order is "clearly erroneous." That a transfer order
29. See generally 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE 0.147 (2d ed. 1954).
30. A. Olinick & Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439, 446 (2d Cir. 1966).
31. Id. at 448. Recently, in Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), the
Solicitor General had an excellent opportunity to put in issue the jurisdiction (power)
of a circuit court to correct by a writ of mandamus an erroneous district court determi-
nation of the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice.
Unfortunately, the Solicitor General did not argue the point. The thrust of recent
Supreme Court holdings, however, seems to have expanded the availability of manda-
mus as a source of interlocutory review. See generally 6 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
54.10(4) (2d ed. 1965).
32. See text accompanying note 18 supra.
33. For the handful of cases in which the district court was reversed, see A. Olinick
& Sons v. Dempster Bros., 365 F.2d 439 n.2, at 444 (1966).
34. Two additional approaches to the review of transfer orders have been sug-
gested. In Rapp v. Van Dusen, Civil No. 14927, 3d Cir., Dec. 16, 1964 (en banc),
vacated and modified on rehearing, 350 F.2d 806 (1965), the Third Circuit originally
stated: "Proper practice requires that in cases such as review of an order of transfer
the petitioners should apply for a rule directed to the prevailing parties to show cause
why the order entered in their favor should not be vacated and set aside." This unique
approach was abandoned on rehearing in favor of a modified mandamus proceeding
whereby the judge below, although named as a respondent, is deemed only a nominal
party and the prevailing parties in the challenged decision are deemed to be respondents
and permitted to answer the petition. Finally, in Note, Appealability of 1404(a)
Orders: Mandamus Misapplied, 67 YALt L.J. 122 (1957), the commentator concludes
that a transfer order fulfills the criteria of the collateral order doctrine established in
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), and that the appro-
priate method of review is interlocutory appeal pursuant to this doctrine. But see
6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAC'rlCg 54.14, at 140-41 (2d ed. 1965).
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frequently can work irremediable hardship on a litigant has been clearly
established.8 5 It is therefore desirable for counsel to have means avail-
able to combat arbitrary or "clearly erroneous" orders of the district court.
This method, to be effective, must be available for use immediately after
the issuance of the transfer order. To promote judicial economy, it would
seem expedient for the courts to treat their interlocutory power to re-
view by mandamus in much the same way as the Supreme Court treats
petitions for certiorari. An administration in this manner would aid in
the realization of the underlying objectives of section 1404(a).
Robert B. White, Jr.
TORTS - DEFAMATION By LIBEL - SHOWING OF SPECIAL DAMAGES
NOT REQUIRED IN AN ACTION FOR LIBEL PER QUOD.
Hinkle v. Alexander (Ore. 1966)
Defendant, the proprietor of a restaurant and boarding house in Esta-
cada, Oregon, which was patronized by loggers who worked in the area,
made a practice of extending credit to the loggers whose employers agreed
to guarantee the payment of their employees' bills. Plaintiff employed a
number of loggers, one of whom obtained credit from the defendant although
the plaintiff had not consented to pay that employee's bill. After the em-
ployee failed to pay a portion of his bill, the defendant requested payment
from the plaintiff who declined to pay. The defendant then posted the bill
in his place of business with the words "Wayne Hinkle [the plaintiff] owes
this to us" written on its face.
Plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for the alleged libel.
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, but the trial court granted a
motion for judgment n.o.v. on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to
allege special damages as required for libel other than libel per se.1 On
appeal, the plaintiff submitted that the defamatory words were actionable
per se, and therefore that he was not required to allege special damages.
The Supreme Court of Oregon initially affirmed, 2 relying on Hudson v.
Pioneer Serv. Co.,; where it had decided that publication of the non-
35. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
1. Note, Libel Per Se aM Special Damages, 13 VAND. L. Rzv. 730 (1960). If
the libelous words are defamatory on their face, they are libelous per se. If the words
are actionable only in the light of extrinsic facts they are libelous per quod. Supra at 731.
2. 411 P.2d 829 (Ore. 1966).
3. 218 Ore. 561, 346 P.2d 123 (1959).
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payment of a debt is not libelous per se. On rehearing, the Oregon Supreme
Court reversed its earlier decision and reinstated the jury verdict,4 holding
that a showing of special damages is no longer required in an action to
recover for a libel per quod.5
The modern law of defamation has evolved from two distinct sources.
Slander, or verbal defamation, arose in the early ecclesiastical courts where
it was treated as a sin.6 Actions for libel, or written defamation, were
originally prosecuted as criminal actions in the Star Chamber to quash
political opposition. 7 When the common law courts began to hear actions
for slander, they required a showing of pecuniary damages unless the
slander was a slander per se.s To constitute slander per se, the words must
have imputed the commission of a serious crime,9 adversely affected the
plaintiff in his business, trade or profession, 1° imputed that the plaintiff
had certain loathesome diseases," or, more recently, imputed unchastity
to a woman.' 2 All other slander was denominated slander per quod and
required a showing of special damages."3
When the common law courts took over libel jurisdiction from the
Star Chamber, they continued, however, to hold written defamation action-
able without proof of special damages.' 4 Thus, the per quod and per se
rules applicable to pleading damages in slander were not considered in
actions for libel. Until the late 19th Century 5 this rule was consistently
applied both in England16 and in America 17 without regard to whether the
statement was defamatory on its face or required evidence of special dam-
ages to establish the libel.' 8
However, certain American courts confused the rules of libel with
those of slander and began to recognize a previously unknown action, libel
per quod.19 Thus, in those jurisdictions which applied the rules of slander
4. ____ Ore .. ,417 P.2d 586 (Ore. 1966).
5. Id. at 590.
6. See Developments in the Law - Defamation, 69 HARV. L. Rev. 875, 887(1956) ; Note, The Doctrine of Libel Per Se in Ohio, 9 W. REs. L. Rev. 43, 44 (1957).
7. Ibid.
8. See Developments in the Law - Defamation, supra note 6.
9. E.g., Buckley v. O'Neil, 113 Mass. 193 (1873) ; Martin v. Stillwell, 13 Johns
275 (N.Y. 1816) ; Brooker v. Coffin, 5 Johns 188 (N.Y. 1809).
10. E.g., Cruikshank v. Gordon, 118 N.Y. 178, 23 N.E. 457 (1890) ; Fowles v.
Bowen, 30 N.Y. 20 (1864).
11. E.g., Golderman v. Stearns, 73 Mass. 181 (1856) ; Taylor v. Perkins, Cro.
Jac. 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1607).
12. E.g., Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952) ; Biggerstaff v.
Zimmerman, 108 Colo. 194, 114 P.2d 1098 (1941).
13. See, Note, Libel Per Se and Special Damages, supra note 1, at 730.
14. Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 335, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812). See also Note,
Libel Per Se and Special Damages, supra note 1, at 730.
15. See, e.g., King v. Lake, Hardres 470, 145 Eng. Rep. 552 (1670) ; Thorley v.
Kerry, 4 Taunt. 335, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812). See also PROSSER, TORTS 783 (3d
ed. 1964).
16. Thorley v. Kerry, 4 Taunt. 335, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (1812).
17. See PROSSER, TORTS 780 (3d ed. 1964).
18. See Note, Libel Per Se and Special Damages, supra note 1, at 731.
19. E.g., Fry v. McCord, 95 Tenn. 678, 33 S.W. 568 (1895). In actions for libel
per quod the courts require proof of special damages just as they do in actions for
slander per quod.
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per quod to actions for libel, unless the libel constituted libel per se,20 it
was held to be a libel per quod requiring proof of special damages. 21
Prior to the decision in the instant case, the Oregon courts had
followed the per quod rule in actions for libel. 22 In this case, however, the
court reconsidered the question of whether to apply the old common law
rule as adopted by the Restatement of Torts23 or the so-called American
rule. 24 In making this determination the court took cognizance of the
present conflict of authority as represented by the respective arguments of
Dean Prosser and Mr. Eldredge.25
Dean Prosser has maintained that allegation and proof of special
damages in actions to recover for a libel per quod is required by thirty-five
states, 26 and that only eight jurisdictions follow the older English rule .2
He advocates the adoption of the requirement of proving special damages
in actions for libel per quod,28 and further argues that a libel which requires
proof of extrinsic facts is incomplete; unless the facts which make the
20. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
21. See cases cited at 9-12 and 19 supra.
22. Ruble v. Kirkwood, 125 Ore. 316, 266 Pac. 252 (1928).
23. The common law rule has been adopted by the RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 569(1938), which provides: "One who falsely, and without a privilege to do so, publishes
matter defamatory to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is
liable to the other although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom."
Comment (c) of § 569 explains: "The publication of any libel is actionable per se,
that is irrespective of whether any special harm has been caused to the plaintiff's
reputation or otherwise."
24. See PROSSER, TORTS 780-83 (3d ed. 1964); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod,
79 HARV. L. Rtv. 1629 (1966) ; Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839 (1960).
The American rule requires that special damages be alleged and proved in any action
for libel where the defamatory meaning is apparent only in light of extrinsic facts.25. Dean Prosser has argued that recovery may be had only for libel per se
without proof of special damages in the majority of U.S. jurisdictions and that the
Restatement should adopt this view. See Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L.
REv. 1629 (1966) ; PROSSER, TORTS 782 (3d ed. 1964) ; Prosser, Libel Per Quod,
46 VA. L. Rev. 839, 849-50 (1960).
Laurence H. Eldredge, a member of the Pennsylvania Bar and an Adviser and
former Revising Reporter on Torts for the American Law Institute, has defended the
current Restatement position. See Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod,
79 HARV. L. Rnv. 733 (1966).
26. See PROSSER, TORTS 782 (3d ed. 1964).
27. Id. at 781. The jurisdictions listed are the United States (federal common
law), Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Texas.
Prosser considered New York to be in a state of fluctuation and confusion.
28. Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, supra note 25, at 1629; Prosser, Libel PerQuod, supra note 25, at 839. Dean Prosser has suggested that § 569 of the Restatement
be amended as follows:
Liability Without Proof of Special Harm
(1) One who publishes defamatory material is subject to liability without
proof of special harm or loss if the defamation is
(a) Libel whose defamatory meaning is apparent from the publication
itself without reference to extrinsic facts, or
(b) Libel or slander which imputes to another
(i) A criminal offense, as stated in § 571,(ii) A loathesome disease, as stated in § 572,
(iii) Matter incompatible with his business, trade, profession or office,
as stated in § 573, or(iv) Unchastity on the part of a woman, as stated in § 574.(2) One who publishes any other libel or slander is subject to liability only
upon proof of special harm; as stated in § 575.
Prosser, Libel Per Quod, supra note 25, at 850.
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material defamatory are a part of the publication, the rules of slander
should be applied.2 9 The best rationale for the per quod rule, however,
was stated by Justice Traynor in MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.30
where he suggested that the rule protects the news media from harassment
by trifling claims of libel.31
Mr. Eldredge maintains that "those appellate courts that have analyzed
the problem and ruled squarely on the question of proof required to recover
in cases in which libel by extrinsic facts is alleged, have all accepted section
569 as sound law ...-32 Mr. Eldredge refers to cases in nine states in-
cluding, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts and New Jersey, which, since the
adoption of the Restatement in 1938, have cited and accepted section 569.33
Only two states, Arizona3 4 and New Mexico,3 5 have actually held that the
plaintiff must prove special damages to recover for a libel per quod. After
a comprehensive analysis of the rules applied in American jurisdictions,
Mr. Eldredge concludes that the weight of authority is with the view
adopted by section 569 of the Restatement.36 He disagrees with Dean
Prosser's position that libel provable by extrinsic facts is less serious because
those facts may be expected to be known only to relatively few people.37
Even in those jurisdictions which nominally follow the per quod rule,
the courts seem to be more interested in a just result than in strict adher-
ence to the rule. In New York, for example, in Hinsdale v. Orange Co.
Publications,3 8 the court side-stepped the per quod rule and held for the
plaintiff on the ground that the material was libel per se even though
extrinsic circumstances were necessary to prove the libel. As the instant
case holds, if the plaintiff is defamed he should be entitled to redress, 39
regardless of whether the defamation is labeled per se or per quod.40
Although Dean Prosser and Mr. Eldredge are both concerned with
the numerical line-up of the courts, the courts should adhere to the most
29. PROSsxR, ToRTs 782 (3d ed. 1964).
30. 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959).
31. 52 Cal. 2d 536, 550, 343 P.2d 36, 43-44 (1959). Even this rationale is unim-
pressive in Oregon because of a retraction statute which permits the news media to
escape liability if they publicly retract allegedly libelous material they have published.
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 30.150 (1965 Supp.). See also Hinkle v. Alexander, Ore.
417 P.2d 586, 589 (1966).
32. Eldredge, supra note 25, at 735.
33. Id. at 743 & nn. 27-35.
34. Ilitzky v. Goodman, 57 Ariz. 216, 112 P.2d 860 (1941).
35. Chase v. New Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P.2d 594 (1949).
36. Eldredge, supra note 25, at 754.
37. One of the specific problems the law of libel is intended to obviate, as pointed
out by Mr. Eldredge, is the yellow journalism which makes statements not defamatory
on their face, but which take into account extrinsic facts known to its readers. Id. at 755.
38. Hinsdale v. Orange Co. Publications, 17 N.Y.2d 274, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270
N.Y.S.2d 586 (1966).
39. Hinkle v. Alexander, ..... Ore. , 417 P.2d 586, 590 (Ore. 1966).
40. Ibid.
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logical and most practical rule, not the most popular. The only rationale
for requiring proof of special damages when the defamatory meaning does
not appear on the face of the language is to protect publishers who made
innocent statements which become defamatory only because of extrinsic
facts known to some readers.4' However, a device such as a retraction
statute42 would afford the necessary protection to innocent publishers with-
out denying a defamed plaintiff the right to recover.43
The traditional distinction between libel per quod and libel per se is
outdated as are the distinctions between libel and slander. Certainly the
radio and television media which broadcast the spoken word have at least
as much impact upon the public as the newspapers and other written media.
It is submitted that the old distinctions between libel and slander should
be abolished, 44 and that such a combined tort should be actionable when-
ever there has been a public defamation.45 If the defamation is not "public"
in nature, recovery should be allowed only upon proof of special damages.
Such a test would provide recovery to the defamed plaintiff, and, at the
same time, would discourage petty spite suits where recovery could be
had only upon proof of special damages.
C. William Kraft, III
TORTS - LIABILITY OF SUPERMARKET - TRIER OF FACT CAN INFER
NEGLIGENCE FROM PRESENCE OF FLOOR DEBRIS CAUSING INJURY.
Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc. (N.J. 1966)
Plaintiff slipped and fell consequent to stepping on a string bean
while shopping in the produce section of defendant's supermarket. At
trial, plaintiff failed to adduce proof of how the bean came to be on the
floor, the duration of its repose, or that defendant knew or should have
known that the bean was on the floor. Defendant's motion for involuntary
41. MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959). See
also Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, supra note 25, at 1646.
42. Statute cited note 31 supra.
43. See supra note 37.
44. See, e.g., PROSSER, TORTS 783 (3d ed. 1964).
45. PROSSER, TORTS 784 (3d ed. 1964).
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dismissal made at the conclusion of plaintiff's presentation was granted
and affirmed by the Superior Court, Appellate Division.1 The Supreme
Court of New Jersey reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that
where a substantial risk of injury is implicit in the manner in which a
business is conducted, and it is fairly probable that the operation is re-
sponsible for creating the hazard or permitting it to arise or continue, the
trier of fact may infer that the operator was negligent. Wollerman v.
Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 221 A.2d 513 (1966).
An occupier's duty of due care to an invitee encompasses both the
duty to avoid negligent activity injurious to the invitee and the affirmative
burden to discover and warn of latent perils. Accordingly, an occupier
must inspect his premises and remedy dangerous conditions. 2 The invitor
is not an insurer,3 however, and breaches of his duty must usually be
established in cases similar to Wollerman by proof not only that a danger-
ous floor condition existed, but that the proprietor negligently created
the condition 4 or had actual or constructive notice of its existence. 5 Res
ipsa loquitur is generally inapplicableO since, although the circumstances
may point to someone's negligence, the technical requirements of that
doctrine do not allow the negligence to be necessarily imputed to the de-
fendant.7
The court in the instant case admitted that absent proof of actual or
constructive notice of the hazard or proof of negligent conduct attributable
to the proprietor, the prevailing approach would dictate that the plaintiff
be nonsuited. Positing that defendant's merchandising techniques had
created the likelihood that some produce would be dropped or fall to the
floor, the court reasoned that he must do what is reasonably necessary to
protect his customers from the hazards engendered by the mode of opera-
tion, whether the particular risk arises from the act of either an employee
or another invitee. It is foreseeable that other customers as well as
1. Unreported.
2. 2 HARPER & JAmeS, TORTS 1487 (1956).
3. See, e.g., Miller v. Hickey, 368 Pa. 317, 324, 81 A.2d 910, 914 (1951).
4. Heina v. Broadway Fruit Market, Inc., 304 Mass. 608 24 N E.2d 510 (1939);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Peterson, 76 F.2d 243 (8th Cir. 1935).
5. Hale v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 129 Cal. App. 2d 124, 276 P.2d 118 (1954)(elapsed sweeping time) ; Morris v. King Cole Stores, Inc., 132 Conn. 489, 45 A.2d 710(1946) (condition of substance that caused the fall) ; Moore v. American Stores Co.,169 Md. 541, 182 Atl. 436 (1936) (condition of grease on floor) ; Hudson v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 275 Mass. 469, 176 N.E. 188 (1931) (dirty piece of candy on thefloor). Circumstantial evidence can be used to establish that the dangers existed, and
that defendant knew or should have known of the hazard and taken steps to remove it.
6. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913) ; Garland v. Furst, 93 N.J.L. 127,107 At. 38 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919). The conditions stated as necessary for the appli-
cation of the principle of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the event must be of a kind which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant;(3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff. PROSSER, ToRTs 218 (3d ed. 1964).
7. See, e.g., Tiberi v. Fisher Bros., 96 Ohio App. 302, 121 N.E.2d 694 (1953).
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employees will drop greens on the floor, and the defendant can be liable
without proof of notice if he failed to use measures commensurate with
this risk, including reasonable inspection procedures" and protection from
dangerous conditions inherent in the nature of the business.'
Thus, actual or constructive notice and a subsequent failure to act
is only one hypothesis upon which defendant's negligence can be pred-
icated. The court reasoned that when the probability that another cus-
tomer dropped the bean so near the moment of the accident that defendant
could not, even if vigilant, have safeguarded the plaintiff is outweighed
by acceptable hypotheses from which the jury could infer that the injury
was caused by a breach of duty owed by the defendant, it is not unjust
to require defendant to come forward with evidence of the precautionary
measures he had taken. Underlying this reasoning is a recognition of an
injured plaintiff's frequent inability to demonstrate the sequence of events
which resulted in the presence of the slip-and-fall causative substance.
Under heretofore existing doctrine, supermarkets have been effectively
insulated from liability for such injuries because of this difficulty which
confronts an injured plaintiff. The instant decision, in offering the plain-
tiff a solution to this problem, does not make the self-service market
proprietor an insurer. The plaintiff's proof merely raises an inference of
negligence which may be disregarded by the jury,10 and would not entitle
plaintiff to a directed verdict if defendant did not offer evidence of due
care; the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff." The defendant is
merely required to explain, not exculpate.' 2
The instant decision was not without supporting precedent. In
Francois v. American Stores Co.,1 the New Jersey Superior Court, apply-
ing res ipsa loquitur, took judicial notice that a customer shopping in a
self-service market is invited to select his merchandise from the store
shelves. By encouraging this potentially hazardous practice, the invitor
assumes a duty of special vigilance which functionally demands the taking
of high precautions. 1 4 In a later case, decided by the Supreme Court,' 5
8. Simpson v. Duffy, 19 N.J. Super. 339, 349, 88 A.2d 520, 525 (App. Div. 1952).
9. Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 200 A.2d 777 (1964).
10. See, e.g., Wildauer v. Rudnevitz, 119 N.J.L. 471, 473, 197 Atl. 252, 253 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1938).
11. See Cleary v. City of Camden, 118 N.J.L. 215, 224, 192 Atl. 29, 34 (Sup.
Ct. 1937).
12. Kahalili v. Rosecliff Realty, Inc., 26 N.J. 595, 606, 141 A.2d 301, 307 (1958).
The phrase, "it is the duty of defendant to go forward with his proof," has been
described as meaning that if defendant expects a favorable jury verdict he should
introduce evidence explaining his due care, and not that any burden of proof rests on
the defendant. Harris v. Mangum, 183 N.C. 235, 238, 111 S.E. 177, 178 (1922).
13. 46 N.J. Super. 394, 134 A.2d 799 (App. Div. 1957) (stacked cans fell on
customer in a supermarket).
14. Id. at 398, 134 A.2d at 801.
15. Bozza v. Vornado, Inc., 42 N.J. 355, 200 A.2d 777 (1964) (slip and fall injury
in a self-service cafeteria).
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it was held that the plaintiff is relieved of proving actual or constructive
notice when he shows that the circumstances were such as to create a
reasonable probability that a dangerous condition would occur from
activities attendant to the premises. Factors found relevant by the court
included the nature of the business, the general condition of the premises,
and a pattern of conduct or recurring incidents.16
The plaintiff's case in Wollerman consisted solely of circumstantial
evidence, but the court did not deviate from the traditional view that the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine is inapplicable in this situation.' 7 The exclusive
control requirement of res ipsa loquitur supplies the necessary causative
nexus between defendant and plaintiff's injuries,' 8 and consequently when
the doctrine is applicable the plaintiff must only show the physical cause
of the accident; where it is inapplicable, as in the principal case, the plain-
tiff must offer evidence tending to prove both the physical and responsible
human cause of his injuries. This requirement can now be satisfied, in
cases similar to Wollerman, by proof that "a substantial risk of injury is
implicit in the manner in which a business is conducted ... .
The plaintiff does not have to isolate the precise breach of duty that
caused injury in a circumstantial evidence case, but the mere possibility
of defendant's negligence as a causative factor is not enough - the jury
should not be allowed to speculate.2° The evidence must be such as to
justify a legitimate inference of probability. 21 Harper and James suggest
that an inference will not be legitimate when:
[W]here from the facts most favorable to the plaintiff the nonex-
istence of the fact to be inferred is just as probable as its existence
... the conclusion that it exists is a matter of speculation ...and
a jury will not be permitted to draw it.22
However, the plaintiff is not required to eliminate every other possible
cause,23 nor provide a rational basis for the conclusion that it is somewhat
more probable than not that his hypothesis is correct in order to have his
case submitted to the jury.24 It is the province of the jury, where differ-
ent inferences may be drawn from the evidence, to draw the inference. 25
16. Id. at 360, 200 A.2d at 780.
17. See notes 6 & 7 supra.
18. O'Mara v. Pennsylvania R.R., 95 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1938).
19. Wollerman v. Grand Union Stores, Inc., 47 N.J. 426, 430, 221 A.2d 513,
515 (1966).
20. Callahan v. National Lead Co., 4 N.J. 150, 154, 72 A.2d 187, 189 (1950).
21. Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 141, 84 A.2d 281, 285 (1955).
22. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1068 (1956).
23. Rosenberg v. Schwartz, 260 N.Y. 162, 166, 183 N.E. 282, 283 (1932).
24. Gutierrez v. Public Serv. Transp. Co., 168 F.2d 678, 680 (2nd Cir. 1948).
25. Warner v. New York, O.&W. Ry., 209 App. Div. 211, 213, 204 N.Y. Supp.
607, 609 (1924).
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It is common knowledge that a supermarket extends an invitation to
its customers to select their own produce from open bins, bag it, and
transport it to a central weighing station. But for the self-service method
of marketing, these activities would be performed by employees of the
proprietor for whose negligent acts the proprietor would be liable. This
responsibility cannot be avoided by the selection of a particular mode of
operation and should demand that the proprietor take adequate precau-
tions to protect his customers from the negligence of other invitees. It is
properly within the province of the jury to determine what precautions
are commensurate with the invitor's duty of exercising due care under
the circumstances.
John P. O'Dea
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